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An Ind.' Run Around the U.C.C.:
The Use (or Abuse?) of Indemnity
I. INTRODUCTION
Depending upon one's perspective, a statute of limitations may seem
either a harsh roadblock on the highway to justice or a comforting as-
surance of limited liability. With respect to a claim for breach of war-
ranty, however, the four-year statute of limitations under Uniform Com-
mercial Code section 2-725 may, in certain circumstances, be neither.2
Recent cases show a clear conflict in how courts interpret the U.C.C.
statute of limitations when a party brings an indemnity claim in a case
otherwise governed by the code.' In jurisdictions that have yet to de-
1. The generally accepted legal abbreviation for indemnity is indemn. BEIBER'S
DICTIONARY OF LEGAL ABBREVIATIONS 260 (3d ed. 1988).
2. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1992) provides as follows:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced with-
in four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less
than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of
the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action
accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is
so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the
same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration
of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the
first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance
or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limita-
tions nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before
this Act becomes effective.
3. Compare Carrier Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the statute of limitation for breach of warranty does not bar an action
for indemnity) and Ameron, Inc. v. Chemische Werke Huls Ag, 760 F. Supp. 1234
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (same) uith Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Agassiz Constr.
Inc., 476 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a breach of warranty limita-
tion bars indemnity action) and Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 634 F.
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cide whether the U.C.C. limitation bars an indemnity claim, an attorney
with a limitation problem may find it worthwhile to look for facts to
permit such a claim and allow a client to avoid the time bar. If the re-
cent flurry of cases on point is any indication, more state supreme
courts are likely to review the question and establish definitive rules in
their jurisdictions.' Before creative lawyering makes the jurisdictional
split more pronounced, the reasoning behind permitting indemnity de-
spite the U.C.C. limitation deserves a closer look.
Suppose A sells a product to B and B uses the product commercially.
Five years later - or even 50 years later - the product fails, enabling
C, a third party, to recover against B, the original buyer, for economic
harm. May B, in turn, recover from A, the seller, under a breach of war-
ranty claim? The plain language of the U.C.C., which starts the statute
for breach of a sales contract upon delivery and prohibits any action on
the breach after four years, says no.5 Several courts agree.8 Other
courts find their way around the four-year statute of limitations through
the cause of action for indemnity, under which a different limitation
runs from the time a typical plaintiff discharges an allegedly common
liability.7 Many courts have yet to make their choice explicit, yet the
conflict presents issues not only going to the heart of the U.C.C.'s pur-
pose but significantly implicating public policy and jurisprudential con-
cerns.
This Comment examines the history and policy behind statutes of
Supp. 1480 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (same). See David Frisch, et al., Uniform Commercial
Code Annual Survey: General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of
Title, 42 Bus. LAw. 1213 (1987). "The division of authority on whether U.C.C. section
2-725 is controlling when the action is for indemnity is further reinforced as more
courts are called upon to decide the issue." Id. at 1256.
But see Debra L Goetz et al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Com-
mercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L REv. 1159, 1324-29 (1987).
Section 2-725 .. . poses few problems: it simply bars a buyer from bringing
an action for breach of warranty more than four years after tender of deliv-
ery. This straight-forward rule forces buyers to sue when evidence is most
readily available and allows sellers to continue with their businesses without
fear of suit after a reasonable definite period.
Id. at 1324-25.
4. The California Supreme Court, based on its recent history of limiting recovery,
is likely to be one of these courts. See infra notes 159-60.
5. A narrow exception to the delivery rule exists when an explicit warranty ex-
tends to future performance, if the breach would not be discoverable until such fu-
ture performance. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2), supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984),
iqfa notes 94-105 and accompanying text; Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc., 460
N.W.2d 413 (S.D. 1990), infru notes 106-118 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565 (Ct. App. 1992);
Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 444 N.W.2d 305 (Neb. 1989).
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limitation,' the indemnity cause of action,' and U.C.C. section 2-725.10
It analyzes cases on both sides of the split," evaluates arguments for
and against using indemnity to overcome the U.C.C.'s statute of limita-
tions hurdle, 12 and proposes that the U.C.C. be made to live up to its
name and intent with respect to uniformity in statutes of limitation.'
Products liability claims brought under tort law" will be addressed to
the extent that the existence of such claims supports or undermines the
policy of permitting implied contractual indemnity under the U.C.C. 5
Under strict products liability, the general rule is that the statute of
limitations runs from the time of injury, although some jurisdictions use
8. See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text
10. See infa notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
11. See infrn notes 92-197 and accompanying text.
12. See infa notes 198-285 and accompanying text
13. See infra notes 286-295 and accompanying text.
14. Although "products liability" is generally associated with tort law, breach of
warranty may be regarded as simply another method of products liability recovery.
See, e.g., Richard T. Farreli, Statute of Limitations, 418 PRAc. L INsTArr. 37 (1991);
John E. Murray, Jr., Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U. Prrr. L REV. 255, 263-
68 (1973); see also East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 868,
866 (1986) ("Products liability grew out of a public policy judgment that people need
more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by the law of warranty."),
quoted in John C. Bartenstein, Recent Developments in Commercial Warranty Law:
Bay State and Canal Electric, 35 BOSTON BJ. 4 (May-June 1991). Bartenstein also
states, "The interpretation of the law of warranties applicable to strictly commercial
transactions has become increasingly muddled over the past two decades as the Mas-
sachusetts courts and legislature have stretched the traditional contours of warranty
law to accommodate products liability and consumer protection concerns." Id. at 4.
15. Authority is split about whether a cause of action for strict products liability
should be subject to the U.C.C. limitation or other limitations. See, e.g., Reid v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 512 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Michigan law to
hold that the four-year U.C.C. limitation allowed suit for personal injuries despite
running of general three-year personal injury limitation; U.C.C. actually had effect of
lengthening limitation period since Michigan's pre-U.C.C. holdings had enforced three-
year limit). But see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (NJ. 1973) (holding that
the U.C.C.'s limitation is inapplicable to strict liability and tort actions).
The prudence of such policies is oft-debated elsewhere. See, e.g., Jerry J.
Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limita-
tion, 56 N.C. L REV. 663 (1978); Sheila I. Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The
Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13 FORuM 279 (1977); Benjamin N.
Henszey, Application of UC.C. Section 2-725 (Statute of Limitations) to Products
Liability Cases-Does it Make Sense?, 9 UCC LJ. 379 (1976-77); see also Cipollone v.
Uggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D. NJ. 1988) (holding that the U.C.C. limitation
does not apply to personal injury action arising out of breach of sales contract).
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the U.C.C. limitation to bar strict liability actions."8 Despite the argu-
able convergence of tort and contract law," courts for the most part
continue to view strict products liability claims as outside U.C.C.
breach of warranty claims'" and recovery for economic loss stemming
from the sale of goods as outside negligence and strict products liability
law.1
Whether future courts will allow recovery on an indemnity theory
16. RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-725:62,
at 121 (3d ed. 1983) and Supp. at 80-81 (1992). See Infante v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 371 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding the U.C.C limitation inapplicable
to indemnity for strict products liability). Moreover, where injury to person or proper-
ty is involved, "'warranty' must be given a new and different meaning if it is used in
connection with" strict products liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A
cmt. m (1965). One commentator suggested, "If personal injury is the result [of an
alleged breach], the only discernible trend is towards uncertainty." Fairfax Leary, Jr.
and David Frisch, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions,
Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 40 Bus. LAw. 1457, 1483 (1985). In
the interest of focusing on the subject matter at hand, and to avoid unnecessary
confusion, this Comment treats the line between warranty and strict products liability
actions as bright, a legal fiction if ever there were one.
17. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) ("Classical con-
tract theory might well be described as an attempt to stake out an enclave within
the general domain of tort."). But see PETER W. HUBER, LIABILIT: THE LEGAL REVOLU-
TION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 207-19, (1988) (arguing that contract law should be re-
vived as the solution to exorbitant costs imposed on society by the existing tort
liability system).
-18. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95A, at
680 (5th ed. 1984).
The Uniform Commercial Code is generally regarded as the exclusive source
for ascertaining when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim
is based on intangible economic loss not attributable to physical injury to
person or harm to a tangible thing other than the defective product itself.
Id See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT, § 402A cmt m (1965) ("The rule stated
in this Section is not governed by... the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warran-
ties . . . ."). Legislative consideration of separate statues of repose cutting off products
liability actions supports the view that strict liability is outside the U.C.C. by demon-
strating legislative understanding of the strict liability cause of action. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, cmt. g (1979); see also John W. Wade, Is 402A Preempted
by the U.C.C., 42 TENN. L REV. 123, 125 (1974). But see Moorman Manufacturing Co.
v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Il1. 1982) (holding that the U.C.C. warranty limi-
tation blocks a strict products liability action to recover economic loss); Elizabeth A.
Heiner, Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc.: What Recovery for
Economic Loss-Tort or Contract?, 1990 Wis. L REv. 1337 (1990) ("Most jurisdictions
are reluctant to extend strict liability recovery to pure economic loss.").
19. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 450. Moorman notes that "the vast majority" of cases
oppose negligence recovery for such economic losses and lists a column full of such
cases. Id at 451. The case for similar recovery under strict liability, where the defen-
dant is subject to liability without any proof of lack of reasonable care, is even
stronger. Id.
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despite the running of the U.C.C. warranty limitation is more than a
mundane technical issue. It goes to the heart of such jurisprudential
concerns as fairness, equity, and efficiency.' As U.C.C. case law is re-
fined, the courts are faced with the question more frequently." When
future courts address the issue, they should, at a minimum, realize that
they are not merely looking at just another statute of limitations case.
Because they are looking at the age-old question of the essence of the
duty that a merchant owes a buyer, they are setting critical legal
boundaries that reflect the purpose of the law.' No literature yet advo-
cates a framework for analyzing this issue. This Comment suggests that
despite strong reasons for keeping tort recovery separate from contract
recovery, courts should borrow from tort law a policy approach for
determining whether the U.C.C. limitation applies. In its application,
however, this approach leads to a conclusion contrary to that reached
by courts that favor tort-style indemnity over the repose putatively re-
quired by the Uniform Commercial Code.'
II. RUNNING STATUTES, OWING DEFENDANTS AND SLAMMING DOORS:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATUTORY RECOVERY LIMITATIONS
A. Statutes of Limitation
Thoughtful literature on limitation statutes is surprisingly sparse.A
One treatment of the subject matter,' published more than forty years
ago, traces such limitations to Roman times and Biblical sources' and
20. See infra notes 25-43 (discussing statute of limitation policy), 51-63 (discussing
indemnity law), and 198-285 (general analysis of policy concerns) and accompanying
text.
21. California was only presented with the issue in 1992. See supra note 3 and
iqfra note 83 and notes 145-160 and accompanying text. The bulk of the remainder
of the cases postdate the 1984 decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Perry v. Pio-
neer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984).
22. For a discussion of the theory that the U.C.C.'s purpose was to maintain the
status quo, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 211-12 (1992).
23. See also William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: Thw
Ascendancy of Contract Over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L REV. 731 (1990); David Knieriem,
Tort v. Contract and Damage to Goods in Missouri, 48 J. Mo. B. 194 (1992).
24. For a comprehensive treatment from a plaintiff lawyer's point of view, how-
ever, see ADOLPH J. LEVY, SOLVING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS (1987).
25. Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L REV. 1177
(1950) [hereinafter Developments].
26. Id. at 1177 (citing RUDOLF SOHM, THE INSTITTrFS OF ROMAN LAw, 282-85 and
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distinguishes between personal actions and actions relating to the re-
covery of property." At early common law, stale personal actions were
likely blocked by elaborate procedural requirements.'
Adverse possession, the area of law where the limitation is perhaps
most critical, is also the area in which the policy behind the limitation
is expressed most clearly: the passage of time should assure security to
one claiming ownership.' Since the enactment of the original English
Statute of Limitations in 1623, o U.S. jurisdictions show no hesitancy in
writing similar legislation into law,3' on the basis that "[tihere comes a
time when [a defendant] ought to be secure in his reasonable expecta-
tion that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he
ought not to be called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'"' "[T]he
disrupting effect that unsettled claims have on commercial inter-
course"' has also been recognized subjectively, if not empirically. The
Supreme Court held that statutes of limitation are intended to protect
defendants from the deprivation "of fundamental fairness or... the
surprise and prejudice that can result from the prosecution of stale
claims."' Justice Holmes called evidentiary concerns "secondary," '
318-22 (Ledlie's Transl.) (3d ed. 1907); 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITAND, THE.HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 81 (2d ed. 1898); cf Deuteronomy, 15:1 ("At
the end of every seven years you shall grant a remission of debts.") (emphasis
added)).
27. Developments, supra note 25, at 1177-78.
28. Id. at 1178. As for foreign jurisdictions, Swiss and German codes contain short
limitations that begin to run when the injured party discovers the damage and the
identity of the wrongdoer and long limitations that run from the time of the wrong;
the French civil code contains a 30-year limitation. Id.
29. RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1012[1]
(1992). Whether one holds a property right in land or in other property, e.g. assets
being claimed in a cause of action for indenmity, the security of property rights argu-
ment would seem to apply.
30. Developments, supra note 25, at 1192 (citing 21 JAC. I, C. .16 (1623)).
31. See id. at 1179-81. -So firmly have statutes of limitations become embedded in
our law in the course of the centuries that legislatures seldom consider them in light
of the various functions that they actually perform . . . ." Id. at 1185. For a more
modem idea of the prevalence of limitations, one need only go to a code index. In
West's GENERAL INDEX TO THE ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES (1992), for example,
there are eight pages of entries under the heading "Limitations."
32. Developments, supra note 25, at 1185 (citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
33. Id.
34. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 372 (1977) (rejecting the
application of California's one-year statute of limitation to a sex discrimination suit
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). In dissent, Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Rehnquist argued that the decision was grossly inconsistent with pre-
cedent requiring the use of state limitations unless the United States sues in its sov-
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and emphasized the defendant's "deepest instincts" with respect to pos-
session of property as the best rationale for the existence of statutes of
limitation.' Holmes's example related to real property, but in a society
where the alienability of real property approaches the alienability of
personal property, there is little reason to distinguish between instincts
respecting land and instincts concerning other assets, such as money
possessed by a defendant in a warranty suit based on an old transac-
tion. Blackstone understood that in a warranty action, a defendant
could only be held liable for the condition of chattels at the time of
sale.3 Hence, the common law rule that the statute begins to run from
delivery was established.' Blackstone's understanding may be recon-
ciled with modern products liability law on the basis that if the condi-
tion at time of sale is such that the product is subject to deterioration,
change, or use making the product dangerous, liability may be found on
that basis.40
Before the U.C.C. was adopted, the central question in breach of war-
ranty cases concerning the statute of limitations was usually not preju-
dice to the defendant, but whether the court characterized the warranty
as present or prospective.4 The American Law Report Annotation
summarized the law in 1931 as follows:
ereign capacity. Id, at 374 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L REV. 457, 476 (1905).
36. Id. at 477.
37. See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 76 (4th ed.
1992). "The history of English land law is a history of efforts to make land more
easily transferrable and hence to make the market in land more efficient." Id. Judge
Posner uses the concept of property rights broadly to refer to much more than land,
and notes that such property rights should be made freely transferable to maximize
efficiency. Id. at 75. The potential of surviving indemnity claims certainly leads to un-
certainty (i.e., risk) and discourages the transfer, for example, of firms that sell goods
with the potential to create claims indefinitely, because risk has a cost. See id at
195.
38. EJ. Caldecott, Note, Sales-Warranties-Limitation qf Actions-Statute of
Limitations Applicable to Action for Breach of Warranty, 21 S. CAL L REV. 429, 429
(citing 3 WIllIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 166 (9th ed. 1783)).
39. Id.
40. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE I 8.06[2) at 8-59 (1985) (comparing and contrasting U.C.C. breach
of warranty of merchantability with strict products liability).
41. Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Action
for Breach of Warranty on Sale of Chattels, 75 A.L.R. 1086, 1086 (1931). "The ques-
tion as to when the Statute of Limitations begins to run ... depends largely upon
the nature of the warranty, i.e., whether it is present or prospective." Id.
1413
Some courts have construed the warranty as present and broken as soon as made,
if at all, so that the statute begins to run at once; other courts have construed
somewhat similar warranties as prospective, or as relating to some future event,
and not broken until the happening of that event Assuming, however, that the
warranty is present, and not prospective, the general rule appears to be, in the
case of a warranty of quality, kind, or condition, that the warranty is broken as
soon as made and the Statute of Limitations begins to run from that time, al-
though the breach is not, and, as, it often appears, could not by reasonable dili-
gence have been, discovered until a subsequent date.'
While 20th-century commercial law carries the adjective "uniform" with
the title of its codification,' one aspect of the underlying issue ad-
dressed in this 1931 Annotation, whether loss incurred by a party that
would otherwise be barred by the apparent breach of warranty statute of
limitation is subject to an action for indemnity, remains irregular.
B. Indemnity
Indemnity, in its earliest 15th-century use, meant "[s]ecurity or protec-
tion against contingent hurt, damage, or loss; safety."4' Later, it came to
mean "exemption from the penalties or liabilities incurred by any course
of action" and then "[clompensation for loss or damage incurred.'
Blackstone and Hume used the term to describe a discharge of a legal
liability.' Prosser's treatise continues to use the word in such a sense
today, defining indemnity as "an order requiring another to reimburse in
full one who has discharged a common liability."47 Indemnity is thus dis-
tinguished from contribution, which provides for partial reimbursement
for the'discharge of a liability.' Despite Prosser's concise definition of
42. Id. For an example of the statute running from delivery, see Provident Loan
Trust Co. v. Walcott, 47 P. 8, 9 (Kan. Ct. App. 1895) (holding that the cause of ac-
tion against a title abstracter for making a mistake in a certificate of title accrues at
delivery of titie and not when it is discovered or when consequential damages arise
and is thus extinguished by the operation of a three-year statute of limitations though
the plaintiff was ignorant during that time of any mistake). See also 2 SIMON GREEN-
LEAF, GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 435, at 411-12 (16th ed. 1899) ("[Tlhough special
damage has resulted, yet the .limitation is computed from the time of the breach, and
not from the time when the special damage arose.*) Until the recent flurry of cases
addressing the issue presented in this Comment, the common thread running through
pre- and post-U.C.C. commentary was not a concern with the distinction between
indemnity and warranty, but rather a concern with when the warranty limitation
starts to run.
43. See infra notes 64-9 0 for a discussion of the history of and policy behind the
U.C.C. statute of limitations for breach of warranty.
44.' OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 196 (1933).
45. Id
46. Id
47. KETON ET AL., supra note 18, § 51 at 341.
48. See, e.g., 18 C.J.S. Contribution § 2 (1990).
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indemnity, Calamari refers to the problems raised by the concept as "vast
and complicated."' Calamari, however, devotes only seven paragraphs
of his hornbook to indemnity, focusing instead on promises of insurance
and third party beneficiary contracts involving municipalities.' If any
general conclusion can be drawn about the concept of indemnity, it is
only that it will continue to be the subject of judicial conflict because "it
is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing men so readi-
ly differ about as the payment of money. ""'
Insurance indemnifies insureds, but indemnity is not insurance.' In-
surance is intended to reduce the risk of loss, but indemnity merely im-
poses the cost of an occurrence on the party that should rightfully bear
that cost.53 In the past, indemnity among joint tortfeasors was
disfavored because it was premised on the wrong of the party seeking
relief.' This Comment is not concerned with express indemnity,' or
joint and several liability," which are the subject of much indemnity-
related literature, but with implied indemnity as a method of establishing
a claim that would otherwise fail because of the statute of limitations.
Tort indemnity is a long-recognized concept with origins in express con-
tractual indemnity.57
49. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 17-8, at 706 (3d ed.
1987).
50. Id.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
52. See Joan T. Schmit, Insurance Versus Indemnification: An Argument for Stare
Decisis, 34 DEF. L J. 125, 126 (1985).
53. See id.
54. Mary Elizabeth Phelan, Comment, Rawson v. City of Omaha. Contribution,
Indemnity and Subrogation-Sharing and Shifting the Loss Under Nebraska Law, 17
CMGHTON L. REV. 323, 332 (1984).
55. See 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §§ 5-28 (1991). These sections of the C.J.S. entry cov-
ering express indemnity are replete with statements contradictory to sections 29
through 51, dealing with implied indemnity. Compare § 13(d) ("An agreement will not
be construed as indemnifying against strict liability unless the language of the agree-
ment specifically shows that this is the intent of the parties.") with § 32 ("The only
limitation on indemnity should be the traditional contract rule which completely bars
indemnity to those whose active participation in the injury has gone beyond simple
negligence."). Express indemnity would be consistent with § 2-725(2) as a warranty
extending to future performance.
56. See, e.g., WiLLjAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRucTuRE
OF TORT LAW 190-227 (1987).
57. See Daniel Waltz, Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative
Negligence: Anomaly or Necessity?, 74 CALIF. L REV. 1057, 1062 (1986). In the tort
setting, Waltz concludes that courts must adopt a policy-based approach over a textu-
1415
Perhaps the most general definition of indemnity is "that form of com-
pensation in which a first party is liable to pay a second party for a loss
or damage the second party incurs to a third party."' One practitioner,
noting that indemnity could be used to get around either a contract or
tort action otherwise barred,' distinguished between implied-in-law in-
demnity and implied-in-fact indemnity in analyzing whether such an ap-
proach is allowed.' Implied-in-law indemnity is established when the
indemnitee recovers from an indemnitor who is also the tortfeasor.8 '
Implied-in-fact indemnity is contract-based and is permitted "only in ex-
ceptional circumstances."' In one sense, whether the running of the
U.C.C. breach of warranty statute of limitations should be considered
such an exceptional circumstance is the subject of this Comment, be-
cause unless the statute has run, plaintiffs have no reason to plead in-
demnity.'
al or historical analysis to find a solution to the problem posed by his title that both
encourages settlements and allocates loss fairly. Id. at 1101. If such is the case with
respect to the historically accepted and proven (albeit "arcane and poorly under-
stood," id. at 1102) doctrine of equitable indemnity, it certainly is true in connection
with the application of indemnity as an innovative way to get around the sale of
goods statute of limitations.
58. Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 500, 502 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990)
(citing State Ins. Fund v. Taron, 333 P.2d 508, 512 (Or. 1958)). The Winnsboro opin-
ion includes a rare, detailed explanation of the different forms of indemnity. Id.
59. Thomas A. Leggette, When Can an Implied Indemnity Cause of Action be
Used to End-Run a Limitations Bar?, 42 FED'N OF INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 33, 33
(1991).
60. Id. at 35-40.
61. Id. at 35. Indemnitee and indemnitor must owe "common or identical duties"
to the third party. Id.
62. Id. at 37 (citing International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan,
Inc., 838 F.2d 124, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1988) (denying contractual indemnity because
there was no "special contractual relationship" between an insurance company and its
broker, such a finding could make "every insurance broker.., an insurer" and
"would do violence to existing indenmity law")).
63. This is because protection broader than, or at least equivalent to, indemnity is
available under the U.C.C.'s consequential damages provisions. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)
("Consequential damages ... include . . . any loss resulting from general or particu-
lar requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise ...
On the other hand, the elements of indemnity are more difficult to establist
In actions for indemnity, courts universally require proof of three elements:
(1) the payor (prospective indemnitee) must discharge a legal obligation the
payor owes to a third person; (2) the prospective indemnitor must also be
liable to the third person; and (3) as between the claimant payor and the
prospective indemnitor, the obligation ought to be discharged by the indemni-
tor.
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984) (citing Ore-Ida
Foods, Inc. v. Indian Head Cattle Co., 627 P.2d 469, 475 (Or. 1981)).
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C. The U.C.C.
The first attempt to develop uniform laws to help exploit the "gigantic
free-trade area" that the United States had become during the Nineteenth
Century was the Negotiable Instruments Law," based on the 1882 Eng-
lish Bills-of-Exchange Act.' Ironically, the Negotiable Instruments Law
was written "with something of a nod to the California code,"' the in-
terpretation of which raised the issue of whether indemnity survives the
breach of warranty statute of limitations in California." The Negotiable
Instruments Law was recommended for enactment by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1906 and adopted by every state before the
Uniform Commercial Code replaced it in the 1950's and 1960's.' The
Uniform Sales Act, also promulgated in 1906, was widely adopted but
subject to criticism helping spark the adoption of the U.C.C.'
Section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code, now the law in all 50
states, was intended
[to introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts, thus eliminating
the jurisdictional variations and providing needed relief for concerns doing
business on a nationwide scale whose contracts [were previously] ... governed
by several different periods of limitation depending upon the state in which the
transaction occurred. This Article takes sales contracts out of the general laws
limiting the time for commencing contractual actions and selects a four-year peri-
od as the most appropriate to modem business practice. This is within the normal
commercial record keeping period.7
64. See THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (Ernest W. Huffcut & Frederick D.
Colson, eds., 2d ed. 1910). The Negotiable Instruments Law did not contain a limita-
tion period. See id.
65. AWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 408 (2d ed. 1985); Samu-
el Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV.
L REV. 561, 562 (1950).
66. Williston, supra note 65, at 562.
67. See id. The case that brought the conflict to light in California was Carrier
Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565 (Ct. App. 1992). For a discussion of this
case, see infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
68. FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 408; W1LLISTON, supra note 65, at 563.
69. See Grant Gilmore, Codyirng Commercial Law, 57 YALE L J. 1341, 1347
(1948).
70. Official Comment, American Law Institute/National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, May 1949 Draft. The rationale is repeated in U.C.C. § 2-
725, 1B U.LA. 525 (1989). Uniform Laws Annotated is perhaps the most useful publi-
cation available for research into how various jurisdictions have treated conflicting in-
terpretations of the code.
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The Code's framers71 made clear their preference for uniformity, ignor-
ing the fact that states had already set their own limitation periods by
statute.12 The framer's preference belies a fundamental conflict among
approaches to uniform law making. Whether uniform laws should simply
reflect existing law or should serve policy goals is the divisive issue.
Grant Gilmore argued for the former purpose."m However, the very title
of the U.C.C. betrays its goal of uniformity, itself a policy objective. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote that uniform laws permit "the supreme courts of
the states to retain their authority as to what a state uniform law means,
but they have every incentive to interpret it to conform to the holdings
of other courts construing the same law."' Exactly what those incen-
tives are remains largely unarticulated. Disparate laws no doubt lead to a
certain degree of inefficiency in interstate commerce,' but empirical
71. The U.C.C.'s "chief intellectual parent" was Professor Karl Uewellyn. FRiEDMAN,
supra note 65, at 675.
72. See, e.g., CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1992) (setting a two-year limitation
for actions on contracts not in writing, but amended to provide an exception when
§ 2-725's four-year limitation is applicable).
73. Gilmore, supra note 69, at 1341. "The principal objects of draftsmen of general
commercial legislation... are to be accurate and not be original." Id. See also
HoRwrrz, supra note 22, at 211 ("It has now become a familiar criticism of Llewellyn
that in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code to reflect mercantile custom, he en-
dowed economically dominant commercial practices with undeserved normativity.").
74. WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 1 (1991). The
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act contains a provision explicitly calling for
it to be "interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uni-
form the law of those states that enact it." UNiF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
ACT § 5, 12 U.LA. 106 (1975 & Supp. 1992). The U.C.C., on the other hand, seems to
invite varying interpretations by calling for it to "be liberally construed and applied to
promote Its underlying purposes and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102 (1992).
75. Variations in laws may be analogized to non-tariff trade barriers in international
trade. See infra note 263 and accompanying text; see also Anita F. Hill, A Compara-
tive Study of the United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the Inter-
national Sale of Goods and Section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 TEX
IN'L L.J. 1, 17 (1990). Professor Hill cites a Texas case, Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1986), as support for the proposition that
with respect to a breach of warranty claim, the "U.C.C. rejected the common law
'discovery rule' for accrual of claims, which states that the limitation period com-
mences when the defect is or should have been discovered." Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Texas case stands firmly for rejection of the discovery rule, id. at 546, but it is
not at all clear that the discovery rule was, in fact, the common law rule. The earlier
rule was that the statute ran from tender, not from discovery. See supra text accom-
panying notes 39-42; see also Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Commences to
Run Against Action 'for Breach of Warranty on Sale of Chattels, 75 A.LR. 1086
(1931):
Assuming ... that the warranty is present, and not prospective, the general
rule appears to be, in the case of a warranty of quality, kind, or condition,
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measurements of such inefficiency are difficult to discern."6
In California, the current split about whether the U.C.C. limitation bars
indemnity can be traced to the adoption of the Code. For pre-code and
current non-code transactions, the California limitation for contract ac-
tions is two years for oral contracts7 and four years for written con-
tracts.T California courts hold that although the statute normally runs
from delivery, in cases in which a defect was not immediately discover-
able, the statute could run from "the earliest possible time the breach
could have been discovered." ' When proposed, section 2-275(2) limited
the discovery rule to situations "where a warranty explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods."' One commentator suggested that
that the warranty Is broken as soon as made and the Statute of Limitations
begins to run from that time, although the breach is not, and, as it often ap-
pears, could not by reasonable diligence have been, discovered until a sub-
sequent date.
Id.
Even in negligence cases, common law courts were reluctant to impose a discov-
ery rule. KEETON ET A., supra note 18, § 30, at 165-68. With respect to intentional
torts, many courts remain, too reluctant to impose a realistic discovery rule. Such re-
luctance even extends to cases of childhood sexual abuse. See Gregory G. Gordon,
Comment, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limitations:
The Need for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20 PEPP. L REV.
1359, 1390 (1993).
76. See PosNER, supra note 37, at 587-88. Judge Posner notes that in the choice of
law context, the proper statute of limitations depends on the purpose of the limita-
tion. If the purpose is "to reduce the error costs associated with the use of stale evi-
dence," the limitation should be that of the forum state because the forum state
presumably knows best how well its courts can deal with such evidence. Id. If the
purpose is "to enable people to plan their activities with greater certainty," the limita-
tion should be that of the injurer's state because it is the injurer who is subject to
uncertainty. Id. It seems rather unlikely that different courts will have significantly
different competence with respect to the use of stale evidence. However, the uncer-
tainty of litigation is no doubt a real cost, at least having much to do with the cost
of insurance. What is uncertain here, however, is whether a shorter limitation reduces
litigation by cutting off remedies or increases litigation by encouraging suits as a
method of protecting plaintiffs' rights. See James A. Gash, Comment, Rethinking Prin-
ciples of Comparative Fault in Light of California's Proposition 51, 19 PEPP. L REv.
1495, 1498-99 (1992) (discussing controversy about the economic effect of imposing
liability on consumer prices and tax rates in the context of joint and several liabili-
ty).
77. CAL CIv. PROc. CODE § 339 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
78. CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
79. Mlitchel J. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commerial Code on the Califor-
nia Law of Sales Warranties, 8 UCLA L REV. 281, 333-34 (1961).
80. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
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the legislature drop the word "explicitly" from section 2-725(2) so that
California case law would survive adoption of the U.C.C.8' At a mini-
mum, such a rule would have been more likely to allow plaintiffs to
claim implied indemnity based on implied warranties. The legislature
failed to accept the recommendation and retained the word "explicitly"
when it adopted the Code in 1967."2 In 1992, however, in Carrier Corp.
v. Detrex Corp.,' a state appeals court might finally have given effect to
what was originally suggested in 1961, at least with respect to situations
in which the breach results in liability to a third party.'
From a national perspective, White and Summers summarized the is-
sue of how courts look at statute of limitations problems under the
Code:
[wie can do little more than warn the lawyer not to make hasty judgments about
the applicable statute of limitations or about when it will commence to run. Sec-
tion 2-725 offers a sane and workable statutory scheme, but it is one the courts
will infrequently follow when the plaintiffs blood has been spilled or when the
defendant is a remote seller. To courts, these cases look like tort, not contract,
particularly when the tort statute of limitations favors the plaintlff.85
They suggest a uniform rule that contract law be applied to all cases
except those involving physical or personal injury, and thus that the
U.C.C. limitation govern breach-of-warranty cases and that state tort law
be restricted to tort cases.' While problems might remain in distinguish-
ing physical injury from economic harm,' this proposed solution is
81. Ezer, supra note 79, at 334,
82. See CAL COM. CODE § 2725(2) (West Supp. 1993).
83. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565 (Ct. App. 1992).
84. Id. at 569 (holding Cal. Com. Code § 2725(2) inapplicable to cases "involving
indemnification for damages under express or implied warranty based on a sales con-
tract"). For further discussion of Carrier, see infra notes 145-60 and accompanying
text.
85. JAmFS J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. Summs, UNIFORM COmmRCIAL CODE 479-80 (3d
ed. 1988) (footnotes omitted).
86. Id. at 477.
87. If property is physically injured but can be repaired by making a simple pay-
ment in a standard commercial transaction, is the damage genuine physical injury or
simply economic harm? For illustrations of the conundrum faced by courts in dis-
tinguishing economic loss from property damage, see James E. Moore, Comment,
Agristor Leasing v. Spindler. Economic Loss, Strict Liability and the UC.C.-What a
Mess, 34 S.D. L REV. 101, 118-19 (1989). In Minnesota, property loss--except the
mere loss of the good itself-is enough to get a plaintiff around the U.C.C. limitation.
See Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992). The story of a
dentist named Vukodinovich, and his burning dental chair, is compellingly told at 2
U.C.C. BULL 5, 5-6 (Feb. 1992). In that case, a state appeals court held that the
U.C.C. limitation had run because the chair was purchased sometime before 1975,
and the fire it allegedly caused did not occur until 1988; thus, Dr. Vukodinovich and
his fellow tenants had no remedy against the manufacturer. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v.
Den-Tal-Ez, 478 N.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The supreme court agreed
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more forthright in its rationale than many of the cases, which tend to
simply cite an arguably applicable rule favoring one outcome over the
other and avoid establishing a full rationale for the chosen general
rule.' Moreover, there is not even agreement as to whether the U.C.C.
applies to personal injury actions.' Therefore, any hope for a quick so-
lution is probably misplaced; uniformity must await the opportunity for
more states to pass on the indemnity issue.'
with respect to the U.C.C. limitation, but gave the dentist a tort remedy. 491 N.W.2d
at 17.
88. For a further examination of the issue of when the section 2-725 statute of
limitations should begin to run, see Kevin D. Lyles, Note, U.C.C. Section 2-725: A
Statute Uncertain in Application and Effect, 46 OHIo ST. LJ. 755 (1985). Lyles pro-
poses a revision of section 2-725 that would extend the four-year limitation to ten
years following tender-of delivery but require that any action be brought within two
years of discovery. Id, at 767. See iqfra note 92 for a discussion of this and other
proposals. See also Richard R. Hyde, Breach of Warranty Statute of Limitations
Under the UCC, 66 MICH. B.J. 504 (June 1987).
89. LEVY, supra note 24, § 4.42, at 156 ("For instance, states variously provide
that- (1) the U.C.C. applies; (2) negligence statutes of limitation and not U.C.C. stat-
utes of limitation apply because the claim is really based in tort; and (3) the U.C.C.
applies, but only if there is privity.") The court in Taylor v. Ford Motor Corp. sum-
marized the U.C.C.'s application to personal injury actions. Taylor v. Ford Motor Co.,
408 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1991). There, the court divided the jurisdictions into three
categories: (1) those holding that 2-725 applies to all breach-of-warranty actions re-
gardless of whether personal injury damages are sought (Delaware, Mississippi, Ore-
gon, Tennessee, and Wyoming); (2) those holding such actions should be subject to
non-U.C.C. limitations (California, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, Utah, and Vir-
ginia); (3) and those that apply the U.C.C. limitation only if privity exists between the
plaintiff and the defendant (Kentucky, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island). Id. at 272.
West Virginia joined the second category. Id. at 274; see 9 U.C.C. BULL 7, 8 (Dec.
1991).
90. See generally PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PEB STUDY( GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY REPORT (1990).
The report notes that "[tihe scope of § 2-725 is frequently litigated" and subject to
jurisdictional variation. Id. at 245. It notes that "[t]he limitation (repose?) period may
be too short, especially in breach of warranty cases." Id. at 246. The report suggests
a revised limitation period of two years from knowledge of breach, tempered by an
eight-year statute yielding ultimate repose. Id. at 246-47. See also An Appraisal of the
March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2
Study Group, 16 DEL J. CORP. L 981 (1991). The task force appraising the report
recommended a limitation running two years from discovery, with no statute of re-
pose. Id. at 1249.
HI. CASES: PRUDENT JURISPRUDENCE?
Some jurisdictions recognize the purported cause of action for indem-
nity on a breach of warranty as a remedy outside the U.C.C.;1 others
view this remedy as running directly contrary to U.C.C. policy, and there-
fore sustain demurrers on the basis of the statute of limitations.' A sur-
vey of cases illustrates these approaches.
A. U.C.C. Statute of Limitations Bars Indemnity
One of the harsher effects of the U.C.C. statute of limitations occurs
when a breaching seller, perhaps hoping that a suit by an unsatisfied
buyer will "go away," or perhaps merely reluctant to enter the world of
litigation, simply waits too long to bring an action against a third-party
defendant-supplier who was at fault for a defect in a chattel causing
harm to a buyer.' That was the case in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Sup-
ply Co.' In Perry, a supplier purchased doors from a manufacturer and
resold the doors to a subcontractor, who in turn conveyed them to a
general contractor. 5 The doors were unsatisfactory, so the general con-
tractor rejected them and bought new doors directly'from the supplier.'
Two years after rejecting the doors, the general contractor sued to recov-
er the purchase price from the subcontractor who sold him the doors.'
The subcontractor, however, waited an additional three years to join the
supplier and more than three years to join the manufacturer in the
suit.' The court held that because more than four years had passed
since the doors were tendered, the subcontractor's indemnity causes of
action were barred by the U.C.C. statute of limitations for breach of
91. See supra note 3.
92. For overviews of recent U.C.C. statute of limitations problems in the form of
annual surveys, see David Frisch and John D. Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers, and Documents of Title, 46 Bus. LAW. 1455, 1500-04 (1991) ("Much of the
tension in this area is directly attributable to the drafters' decision to choose tender
of delivery as the time when a breach of warranty occurs and a cause of action ac-
crues (a date-of-delivery rule)."). Further notation appears in the 1992 annual survey
carrying the same titie, 47 Bus. LAw., 1517, 1540-43.
93. The harshest effect arguably occurs when a buyer, through no fault, falls to
discover a defect that would otherwise constitute a breach of warranty within the
four-year limitation.
94. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). The court noted that the goods were properly
stored, indicating no factual issue as to the subcontractor's fault for the defect Id. at
216.
95. Id. at 216.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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warranty.'
The court treated the case as one of statutory interpretation.'O' It
found that although "the limitation period specified in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code conflicts with the general limitations rule for indemnity
actions," U.C.C. section 2-725 "controls all actions for breach of contract
for the sale of goods .... ."'0 The unanimous court noted that as a stat-
ute of repose, section 2-725 bars such causes of action regardless of the
usual reasons for tolling. '
In addition to demonstrating the effect of the U.C.C. limitation on a
buyer, Perry raises the disturbing possibility that a plaintiff-customer
could force an innocent reseller, ignorant of any defects in a chattel, to
bear the entire loss from a breach of warranty if the plaintiff-customer
simply waited until late in the limitations period to file suit, leaving the
innocent reseller insufficient time to file suit for indemnification.1" In
99. Id. at. 217. The subcontractor was in an unfortunate position because, in addi-
tion to losing his indemnity claims on summary judgment, he had stipulated to liabili-
ty for the doors at trial despite a factual finding that he had properly stored the
doors and presumably was not responsible for the condition that caused the buyer to
reject them. Id. at 216.
100. Id. at 216, 218.
101. Id. at 218.
102. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, cmt. g (1977)).
In recent years special 'statutes of repose' have been adopted in some states
covering particular types of activity such as special negligence for doctors,
lawyers or architects, or products liability, or liability of building contractors.
These statutes set a designated event for the statutory period to start running
and then provide that at the expiration of the period any cause of action is
barred regardless of the usual reasons for 'tolling' the Statute.
Id,
A statute of limitation typically bars suit at a certain time after injury occurs; a
statute of repose bars "action after a specific time has elapsed, regardless of whether
there has as yet been an injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, the
standard distinction between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose is irrelevant
when injury is held to have occurred at the. time of breach rather than at the time of
discovery, and repose is calculated, like the limitation, from the time of tender. If in-
jury is held to have occurred at the time of delivery, as in Perry, it does not matter
whether § 2-725 is labeled a statute of repose or limitation. Can a buyer be injured
without knowing it? If a tree falls in .the forest, does it make a sound if no one is
there to hear? See also Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 417 (N.C.
1982) (statutes of repose "set a fixed time limit after the time of the product's manu-
facture, sale or delivery beyond which the product seller will not be held liable").
103. Blameworthy conduct on the part of the buyer is not required to cause a situ-
ation arguably inequitable to the seller. For example, manufacturer builds product on
September 1, 1990 and ships to seller. Seller tenders product to buyer on January 1,
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Perry itself, the subcontractor had about two years after learning it was
being sued in which to file suit against the supplier and the manufactur-
er. However, suppose the buyer had filed suit against the subcontractor
one day before the statute had run. Unless the subcontractor could im-
mediately find an attorney, draft a complaint and get it to the court-
house, he would face almost certain liability without a just opportunity
to plead a cause of action for indemnity. Whether this result is too harsh
depends on whether the subcontractor knew about or had a duty to
know about the defect and failed to do anything to remedy the situa-
tion.' 4 If so, such a situation would presumably impute sufficient
blame upon the subcontractor to justify the harsh result. If not, however,
forcing the subcontractor to bear the entire loss would seem, at a mini-
mum, inequitable."°
Another court, while also denying recovery on an indemnity claim
under the U.C.C., established a test that could mitigate the harshness of
the U.C.C. limitation. In Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc.,"s Morris
purchased parts for an irrigation system that he installed on a ranch in
central South Dakota" The system failed because of defective parts,
and the rancher went into bankruptcy." During litigation over the
failed system, the parties neither notified the manufacturer of the alleg-
edly defective parts nor filed suit until more than four years after the
system had been installed."°
The Morris court held that section 2-725 indicated a legislative intent
to impose "ultimate repose in transactions for the sale of goods"1 and
found that the U.C.C. barred an indemnity action against the manufactur-
er."' Although it did not adopt it, on grounds that the limitation had
1991. Product fails on December 1, 1994, and buyer files suit against seller on De-
cember 31, 1994, to protect its interests under a breach of warranty action. Unless
seller can get to the courthouse rather quickly, however, seller has no remedy against
manufacturer because tender to him started the limitation running on January 1, 1991,
and it lapsed on January 1, 1995.
104. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1992) (imposing such a duty on merchants "in goods of
the kind"). Issues with respect to the merchant clause are infrequently litigated. See
WHIrE, supra note 85, § 9-7 at 409. The code is clear that within the limitations peri-
od, there is veritable strict liability for resellers. See id. at 408.
105. For a discussion of duty and equity questions, see infra notes 247-59 and text
accompanying.
106. 460 N.W.2d 413 (S.D. 1990).
107. Id. at 414.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 416, citing Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Wickham Pipeline Constr., 759 P.24
71, 76-77 (Idaho 1988).
111. Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 418. The exact language of the Morris court is instruc-
tive, but troublesome, because future courts may be able to interpret it creatively. It
is possible to argue that the court decided Morris on alternative grounds: (1) that
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run, the court nevertheless set forth and applied the standard test for
indemnity, concluding it was not met even though the limitation had run.
To state such a cause of action, the court held, "The party seeking in-
demnity has to show an absence of proportionate fault so that the entire
liability can be shifted."" The rancher and the installer were both
aware of the problem with the irrigation system early on, but chose not
to attempt a suit until later."3 Thus, the record failed to show any dili-
gence on the part of the rancher or installer after they learned of the
nonconformity.""" However, even if the parties had acted diligently up-
on discovering the alleged breach of warranty, showing a total absence
of conduct potentially prejudicial to a defendant, the strident tone of the
majority opinion in Morris, and the characterization of the U.C.C. limita-
tion as a statute of repose, indicates that the South Dakota Supreme
Court would be unlikely to recognize an exception to the U.C.C. limita-
tion in a breach of warranty action. 5
the code limitation by its explicit language and by legislative intent bans all indemni-
ty actions, and (2) that facts allowing for equitable relief through indemnity were not
presented. See id. at 416-18. As to the first ground, the court stated, "[Alpplication of
the general indemnity rule (statute of limitations does not begin to run until liability
attaches to indemnitee) would contradict the legislature's specific directive ... ." Id.
at 416 (emphasis added). However, it is unclear whether the court needed to decide
this issue in order to resolve the case. The court further held that indemnity was
unavailable because the party seeking it failed "to show an absence of proportionate
fault." Id. at 417. Nevertheless, the court was emphatic about its interpretation of
section 2-725, citing virtually every case on that point and analyzing the U.C.C. issue
in much greater depth than the indemnity issue. Id. at 416-17. The better analysis
seems to be that the holding was based on the premise that the U.C.C. limitation
was controlling. Even if not controlling, however, indemnity probably would have
been unavailable on the basis of the fault of the party seeking it.
A cursory reading of the case might leave the impression that the South Dakota
Supreme Court decided the U.C.C. issue in 1969, shortly after the state adopted the
Code in 1966. Id. at 416 (citing Chipperfield v. Woessner, 166 N.W.2d 727 (S.D.
1969)). The citation to Chipperfield could be read for the proposition that section 2-
725 "is a statute of repose which sets a fixed period after the running of which ac-
tions are barred." Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 416. Chipperfield, however, involved the
South Dakota limitation for personal injury actions and merely stands for the point
that South Dakota law treats such limitations as statutes of repose. Chipperfield, 166
N.W.2d at 728. For an explanation of the distinction between statutes of repose and
limitation, see supra note 102.
112. Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 417.
113. Id.
114. Id,
115. See supra note 111. The general provisions of the U.C.C. are not very helpful
here. One section provides that "[uinless displaced by the particular provisions of this
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The dissent in Morris cited New York law for the proposition that in-
demnity is a separate cause of action from breach of warranty under the
U.C.C. and therefore subject to its own statute of limitations."' Rather
than the code limitation to the indemnity action, however, the dissent
suggested using the alternative six-year pre-U.C.C. limitation established
in the South Dakota Code for breach of contract."7 The dissent also
found that section 2-725 violates the South Dakota Constitution, because
it "prevents a cause of action before it accrues" and thus impermissibly
blocks the state guarantee of a right of access to the courts."8
Act, the principles of law and equity .. . shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-
103 (1992). Another section provides that the code is to be "liberally administered to
the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages
may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law."
U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1992) (emphasis added). Reading these provisions in light of the
rule of statutory interpretation that the specific controls the general, one gleans that
courts applying the U.C.C. may venture outside the Code for either legal or equitable
remedies, except when certain types of damages are involved. A literal reading, then,
may first classify indemnity as special damages, because it involves certain payment
to a third party, and then ban it as remedy not permitted by "rule of law," given its
equitable basis. However, indemnity is also available as a legal remedy. See GEORGE
E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESITUTION §1.5(d), at 29 (1978).
The Morris court cited the Restatement of Restitution for the proposition that
"[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him
but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other,
is entitled to indemnity." Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 417 (citing Restatement of Restitution
§ 76). However, the court also held that denial of indemnity was not inequitable
because the installer sat on his rights: Id. In effect, the court applied the doctrine of
laches without explicitly saying so.
116. Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 418 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (citing McDermott v. City of
New York, 406 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1980)). The holding in McDermott, however, a per-
sonal injury-product liability case, is arguably inapplicable to a U.C.C. breach of war-
ranty action for property or economic damage. See McDermott, 406 N.E.2d at 461.
117. Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 418 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 15-2-13(1) (1984)). The reasoning of the dissent, however, is slightly enigmatic.
It stated that "[a] cause of action based on indemnity should be controlled by a stat-
ute of limitations based on indemnity," Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 418, but failed to ex-
plain why a general statute of limitations applying to any action should control the
statute of limitations relating to the sale of goods, when the case at hand clearly
involved the sale of goods. See id. See also Bellevue South Assoc. v. HRH Constr.
Corp., 579 N.E.2d 195, 202-03 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that six-year general contract limi-
tation rather than the four-year U.C.C. limitation was applicable to breach of warran-
ty/fmdemnity action by subcontractor against manufacturer of floor tiles and that limi-
tation ran from payment by subcontractor to owner of premises).
118. Morris, 460 N.W.2d at 418-19 (Sabers, J., dissenting). The South Dakota Consti-
tution provides that "[aill courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done
him in his property, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and right and justice, administered without denial or delay." Art. TV, § 20. See also
Vlardebo v. Keene Corp., 431 So. 2d. 620, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (statute of
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The wide range of reasoning applied to the issue of whether the law of
indemnity should control is well illustrated by the decision of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in People's Democratic Republic of Yemen v.
Goodpasture, Inc. " In that indemnity action, Yemen was awarded
$370,000 in a bench trial against a company it accused of selling insect-
infested wheat." On appeal, the seller argued that Yemen's claims did
not qualify as indemnity claims and, thus, were barred by the four-year
statute of limitations for ordinary breach-of-contract claims. The court
was clearly correct to strike two claims relating to the cost of delayed
shipments because such "claim[s]-for consequential damages resulting
from the delivery of defective goods-[were] for breach of contract, not
for indemnity," as the payments for which Yemen sought indemnity were
made to the defendant rather than to a third party.'21 A third claim, for
reimbursement of a deadfreight charge,"2 satisfied the test for payment
to a third party, but again was characterized as "nothing more than a
claim for consequential damages... " and thus was barred by the lim-
itation.' The court reversed the fourth indemnity award because al-
though the defendant prevented the ship hired by Yemen from docking,
thereby forcing Yemen to pay its shipper to sit idle, the court found no
duty running from the defendant to the shipper to allow docking."
Yemen raises three issues subordinate to the question of whether the
indemnity or code limitation should apply: (1) Why should courts distin-
guish payments made to third parties in the form of indemnity from pay-
ments made in the form of other costs imposed on defendants by the
consequences of a breach of warranty? (2) What difference between con-
sequential damages and indemnity justifies different treatment? And (3)
why must there be a duty running from a potential third-party indemnitor
to the party to whom the indemnitee made payment to justify indemnity,
if it is allowed? These issues are discussed below.126
A handful of other cases hold that indemnity does not survive the
repose unconstitutional).
119. 782 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 347-48.
121. Id. at 350.
122. A deadfreight charge is the amount due a shipper for unused shipping capaci-
ty. Id. at .350-51.
123. Id at 351.
124. Id. at 352. Again, the remedy sought was classified as consequential damage,
subject to the U.C.C. limitation. Id.
125. See infra notes 210-260 and accompanying text
1427
U.C.C. limitation. In Payne v. Far-Mar-Co.,'2 a Missouri court denied
indemnity on a breach of warranty claim filed seven years after tender of
delivery of soybeans." The court held that when Missouri enacted sec-
tion 2-725 in 1963, it created an exception to the previously enacted gen-
eral statute"2 providing for a ten-year limitation on actions based on
writings for the payment of money or property."2 It reasoned that in
adopting the comment, the legislature's purpose was reflected by the offi-
cial comment to section 2-725, which, in addition to noting the need for
uniformity,"3 suggests that the code "takes sales contracts out of the
general laws limiting the time for commencing contractual actions and
selects a four-year period as the most appropriate to modem business
practice." 3 ' In finding the law so clear cut, the court issued only a brief
opinion devoid of any equitable arguments."3
One case cited for support by both the Perry and Morris courts actual-
ly goes beyond those two cases by imposing the section 2-725 limitation
on a third-party indemnity complaint in a wrongful death action." In
PPG Industries v. Genson, the plaintiffs son died after falling through a
glass wall at a movie theater." The theater sought indemnity from the
glass company, but the court denied the claim because tender had oc-
curred more than four years before the theater made its contract claim
against PPG." In a brief opinion, the court placed responsibility for the
condition of the premises on the landowner, and not the merchant."
In a 1988 Idaho case, six different parties, in a fact pattern worthy of
use in only the cruelest of contract examinations, fought out who would
bear a loss caused by the supply of allegedly defective pipe.'W The state
supreme court limited its review to whether the section 2-725 limitation
126. 612 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
127. Id.
128. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.110 (Vernon 1951).
129. Payne, 612 S.W.2d at 55.
130. See text accompanying supra note 70, for the text of the U.C.C. comment
concerning uniformity.
131. Payne, 612 S.W.2d at 55 (citing comment accompanying Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 516.110 (Vernon 1951); U.C.C. § 2-725, IB U.LA. 525 (1989)).
132. See also Reiss v. Pacific Steel Pool Corp., 341 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1973) (holding that a four-and-a-half-year-old claim for goods sold and delivered
was subject to the U.C.C.'s four-year limitation and therefore barred).
133. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Genson, 217 S.E.2d 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
134. Id. at 480.
135. Id. The court dismissed a negligence claim against the glass maker on the
basis that the theater and its architect approved the use of the grade of glass pro-
posed by PPG. Id. at 481.
136. Id. But see Carrier Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565 (Ct. App. 1992)
(failing to place analogous responsibility on a landowner for pollution from an indus-
trial system); see infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
137. Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Wickham Pipeline Constr., 759 P.2d 71 (Idaho 1988).
1428
[VoL 20- 1407, 19931 Indemnity and the U.C.C. Statute of Limitations
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
protected the pipe supplier or whether two of the parties could get
around that limitation to join the supplier to indemnify them, against
claims that they had defaulted on their contractual responsibilities."
The court held that by delaying their action, the indemnity plaintiffs gave
up their legal claim when the statute ran and lost their equitable claim
because there had been an adequate remedy at law." If the court had
concluded the case on this point, it would have implicitly left open the
possibility that plaintiffs who do not have an adequate remedy at
law-who, for example, do not learn of a breach during the four-year
U.C.C. limitation period-may yet be entitled to indemnity. However, the
court went on to adopt the reasoning in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Sup-
ply Co."4 that section 2-725 "was apparently intended to afford ultimate
repose in transactions for the sale of goods."' Thus, Idaho joined
Utah, Missouri, and Georgia as jurisdictions explicitly finding that the
U.C.C. limitation cuts off indemnity actions. South Dakota prefers the
U.C.C., but leaves open a small window that parties seeking indemnity
might be able to enter if equity so mandates. Elsewhere, that window is
wide open."
B. Indemnity Claim Survives Despite U.C.C. Limitation
While half a dozen jurisdictions clearly favor the U.C.C. limitation over
the indemnity cause of action, another handful find that the U.C.C.
should not block such an effort, even when, in the words of White and
Summers,'" the plaintiffs blood is not spilled.TM  Perhaps most signifi-
138. Id. at 73.
139. Id. at 74.
140. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
141. Farmers, 759 P.2d at 76.
142. See also Housing and Redevelopment Auth. v. Agassiz Constr. Inc., 476 N.W.2d
781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). -The [U.C.C.] provides the sole remedy for economic loss-
es due to property damage resulting from a commercial transaction, and allows no
recovery under tort theories of negligence or strict products liability." Id. at 783.
"[WIhere the sale of goods is the predominant purpose of a sales contract, the U.C.C.
governs all breach claims which arise from that sale." Id. at 785. Thus, an indemnity
claim based on discoloration of stucco caused by delivery of the wrong lumber, id.
at 783, was extinguished by operation of § 2-725. Id. at 785.
143. See supra note 85 and accompanying text
144. WIuTE & SUMMERS, supra note 85, at 479-80. But see John C. Reitz, Against
Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims Rule in UC.C., § 2-607(3)(a),
73 CORNELL L. REV. 534 (1988). Reitz noted that as of his writing, it appeared that
the U.C.C. limitation was enjoying greater judicial popularity than indemnity as a
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canty, a California court decided the issue for the first time in 1992 and
gave enterprising trial attorneys an additional weapon to use in products
liability attacks. In September 1979, Carrier Corporation, an air condition-
er manufacturer, purchased from Detrex Corporation a system to remove
grease from air conditioner coils."4 In April 1985, Carrier noticed that
the system was using more Perchloroethylene" (PCE) than normal and
discovered that the degreasing system was leaking PCE into the soil be-
low its plant.4 7 Carrier notified the government and undertook clean-up
efforts costing an estimated $10 million." In October 1988, more than
three years later, Carrier filed a breach-of-warranty claim for damages
against Detrex.'4 In 1990, Carrier amended its claim to seek indemnifi-
cation for clean-up costs. The trial court granted Detrex's motion for
summary judgment, based on the four-year U.C.C. limitation, which ran
in 1983."0
In this case of first impression in California, the Court of Appeal re-
versed the trial court and sustained the action against the seller on the
basis of Carrier's amended complaint for indemnity.'' In holding that
the 1979 seller could be liable in indemnity for the clean-up costs of sys-
tem leakage discovered in 1985, the court discounted the seller's argu-
ment that the buyer was being permitted to "plead around" the intent of
the U.C.C.'" Instead, the court held that California should adopt the
reasoning of a New York case that allowed New York City to seek in-
demnity when an employee's arm was severed by a garbage truck, de-
spite the running of the U.C.C. limitation." The difference, of course,
between the two cases was that the New York case involved personal in-
jury while the California case involved only clean-up costs." Neverthe-
less, without recognizing this distinction, the court held that "[t]here is a
substantial difference between an instance where a product simply fails
means to avoid it. Id. at 571, n.111.
145. Carrier Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 566 (Ct App. 1992).
146. Perchloroethylene is a common degreasing agent that is a suspected carcino-
gen. C. Claborne Ray, Q&A, N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 5, 1991, at C9; Philip Shabecoff, Esti-
mate of Risk of Dioxin Is Cut in Cancer Study, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1987, at Al.
147. Carrier, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566.
148. Id. at 567. The parties disputed the actual cost of the clean-up. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 569.
152. Id. at 568.
153. Id. (discussing McDermott v. City of New York, 406 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1980)).
154. Carrier conceded it was not seeking relief for injury to real property. Id. at
570. California Civil Code § 338 establishes a three-year limitation for injury to real
property. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 1992). Because the pollution was discov-
ered in early 1985 and the action was not filed until late 1988, id, at 567, that limita-
tion had run.
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as opposed to a situation where the product fails and causes damage to
a third party."" That there actually was damage to a third party, be-
yond the mere threat of groundwater contamination, was not reported in
Carrier. Nor did the case make clear why the seller of the product
should pay for any such damage rather than the user. The court held that
the third party to whom payment was due was the government." How-
ever, no payment to the state had been made. The court found that the
mere potential for liability under anti-pollution law created an indemnity
situation,57 which seems a rather broad expansion of potential liabili-
ty."' The California Supreme Court denied review," perhaps awaiting
a trial record permitting complete analysis, or a contrary decision from
another district court that it could affirm. Such a scenario seems likely
given the national split on the issue, the recent flurry of decisions dis-
cussed herein, and the large number of Republican appointees to the Cal-
ifornia bench in recent years who might be more inclined to limit the
scope of liability in commercial transactions.T
Illinois case law on point has its relatively recent origins in the land-
mark 1982 case of Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank
Co.,"6 ' in which the state supreme court rejected strict products liability
155. Carrier, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570. If Carrier is overruled, the court's attempt to
analogize McDermott seems a likely point of attack.
156. Id. at 569.
157. See id.:
Had Carrier not complied with the [clean-up] order, it likely would have had
to defend an injunctive action brought by the Attorney General. Additionally,
if the Los Angeles Regional Board did the abatement work, it would be enti-
tled to recover the costs thereof from Carrier in a civil action.
IdA. This, however, hardly qualifies as reasoning for the proposition that the seller
should pay for damage caused by property in the possession of the user.
158. Cf. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984) (dis-
cussing the elements required for indemnification), supra note 63.
159. No. B056060 (June 18, 1992), 1992 Cal. Lexis 3157.
160. The author of Carrier, Michael G. Nott, was appointed by Republican Governor
George Deukmejian, but he had a background in civil litigation as a name partner in
the firm that "pioneered asbestos injury litigation among dockworkers" in the Long
Beach area. Joe Applegate, Profile: Michael G. Nott, THE DAILY JOURNAL, June 22,
1988. The current trend of California courts toward limiting tort liability would seem
to make the survival of Carrier uncertain. See generally Lorraine A. Musko,
Christensen v. Superior Court, California Supreme Court Survey, 20 PEPP. L REV. 878
(1993).
161. 435 N.E.2d 443 (1l. 1982). Moorman contains an outstanding history of strict
liability in tort and a summary of the argument over allowing recovery for purely
economic loss under such a cause of action. Id. at 445-48.
recovery for purely economic loss.'I While indemnity per se was not at
issue in Moorman, the court held that the sole avenue of relief was a
U.C.C. action and that the code limitation barred the action.16 The next
year, the court distinguished Moorman from Maxfield v. Simmons,'" a
case in which indemnity was sought, by creating a dichotomy in which
"[slection 2-725 controls in causes of action based on contract principles,
but not in those causes of action based on tort principles."" In addi-
tion to economic loss, Maxfield also involved damage to property." In
drawing the line between economic damage and other forms of damage,
the court illustrated the truism proffered by a concurring judge in
Moorman that "a tort approach to enforcing routine commercial expec-
tations is as fictitious as a warranty theory usually is for personal inju-
ries."1 17 It went further, however, by placing property damage on the
personal injury side of the truism instead of the economic injury side,
thus keeping alive the debate explained in Moorman."
The following year, an Illinois appellate court seemingly departed from
the contract/tort dichotomy set out in the second Illinois Supreme Court
case."9 In Anixter Bros., Inc. v. Central Steel & Wire, the court charac-
terized a claim as "an implied contract of indemnity action," but never-
theless took it outside the U.C.C. contract limitation.7 ' The court rea-
soned that despite its name, an implied contract of indemnity is not a
162. Id. at 448.
163. Id. at 454.
164. 449 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. 1983).
165. Id. at 112.
166. Id. The property damage was to a house from allegedly defective support
beams. Id. at 110. See itrfta notes 255-58 for reference to a survey article criticizing
Maxfield. See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 512
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding that § 2-725 does not bar counterclaims or set-off claims).
The court noted that in the wake of Moorman and Maxfield "there is a great deal of
uncertainty and complexity in this area of Illinois law .... ." Id. at 518.
167. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 456 (Simon, J., concurring). Justice Simon continued:
"We need both, and this case should not be construed to foreclose that possibility."
Id. The next year, the Utah Supreme Court used Maxfield as support for the rule
that the U.C.C. bars indemnity actions on the basis that the Illinois plaintiff had
pleaded a separate cause of action for negligence. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 n.2 (citing Maxf/eld, 449 N.E.2d at 112). Maxfield is not as
clear as Perry might indicate, but is open to Utah's interpretation.
168. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 445-48.
169. Anixter Bros., Inc. v. Cent. Steel & Wire, 463 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. App. 1984). See
supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
170. Id. at 917. In Anixter, a microwave antenna manufacturer purchased brass
tubing. Id. at 915-16. The antenna buyer alleged economic harm and sued for damag-
es. Id. at 916. The manufacturer sought damages from the tubing company under an
implied contract for indemnity that the trial court would have time-barred using the
U.C.C. The appellate court, however, said the cause of action sounded in tort and
therefore justified recovery in the face of the U.C.C. limitation. Id. at 917.
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contract action, but a tort action.' In so holding, Anixter brought Illi-
nois case law to the side of the U.C.C.-indemnity split favoring the in-
demnity statute of limitations. However, the lack of a definitive supreme
court holding in Illinois, as in California, leaves room for doubt about the
ultimate outcome there.
In reversing the trial court, the Illinois appellate court presented the
issue as a choice between the supreme court cases of Moorman and
Maxfield. Moorman held that to allow tort theories to be used in an ac-
tion to recover merely economic damages would "eviscerate the warranty
sections of the U.C.C."" On the other hand, Maxfield, decided the fol-
lowing year, held that Moorman did not control in the latter case be-
cause
[a] single transaction or occurrence, such as an injury caused by a defective
product, will typically present the possibility of causes of actions sounding in im-
plied warranty, express warranty, negligence, and strict liability. Section 2-725
controls in causes of action based on contract principles, but not in those causes
of action based on tort principles. A recognition of this implied right of indemnity
does not 'eviscerate' the UCC's statute of limitations contained in section 2-725,
since it has no application to the indemnity cause of action."
The court further held that "an implied contract of indemnity action is
not a contract action." 74 However, the result in Anixter is directly con-
trary to the philosophy the Illinois Supreme Court expressed in
Moorman, that tort remedies should not be applied to "causes of action
based on contract principles."
Unlike Carrier, in which the court held that there was a cause of ac-
tion even before an indemnity payment was made,7" Maine's supreme
court held that such a claim accrues when payment is made to a third
party.'77 In Cyr v. Michaud, a trial court's dismissal on limitations
grounds of an indemnification claim by the owner of a harvester against
the manufacturer was overruled." Cyr, however, involved a personal
171. Id. at 917.
172. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 447.
173. Anixter, 463 N.E.2d at 916 & n.4 (quoting Maxfield v. Simmons, 449 N.E.2d
110, 112 (I1. 1983)).
174. Id. at 917.
175. See supra text accompanying note 173; see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chi-
cago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing Maxfield as a "nar-
row exception" to Moorman).
176. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 569 (1992).
177. Cyr v. Mlchaud, 454 A.2d 1376, 1385 (Me. 1983).
178. Id.
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injury action" like the one in the New York case"s that the California
court relied on in Carrier.8' Thus, the fact that the court allowed the
warranty cause of action to survive was of little import because the tort
liability action would have survived under well-settled law. The Cyr court
did, however, take a position that would have mitigated the potentially
harsh result in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.8' by holding that
the limitation begins to run upon payment of the judgment rather than
tender of delivery, as in Perry." This result was similar to the 1987 de-
cision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Jaswell Drill Corp. v.
General Motors Corp."u There, the purchaser of an oil rig sued Jaswell
on breach of warranty and other theories, and Jaswell sued GM for in-
demnity. The court, with little analysis, treated the indemnity claim as
wholly separate from the U.C.C. breach of warranty claim, concluding
that "the 'statute of limitations cannot possibly start to run on an indem-
nity claim until the party seeking indemnification suffers a loss.'""
In Hanscome v. Perry," a Maryland appellate court agreed that the
majority view "seems to be" that an indemnity cause of action may by-
pass the section 2-725 limitation," but then limited the right of indem-
nification through an analysis of tort and contractual duties."s Despite
179. Id at 1378.
180. McDermott v. New York, 406 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1980).
181. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 568-69 (1992).
182. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). See supra text accompanying note 94.
183. In so holding, the Cyr court arguably established Maine's rule for both contract
and tort actions.
184. 529 A.2d 875 (N.H. 1987).
185. Id. (citing Morrisette v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 322 A.2d 7, 12 (N.H. 1974)).
This appears consistent with the dissent's approach in Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation,
Inc., 460 N.W.2d 413 (S.D. 1990), criticized in supra note 116 and accompanying text
See also E.S.P., Inc. v. Midway Nat'l Bank, 447 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1989) (holding that
the limitation does not run against party seeking indemnity until it sustains loss, de-
spite prior breach of warranty). In E.S.P., the court reasoned that encouraging earlier
suits would burden banks, contrary to the policy of streamlining commerce. Id at
886. That It is better for commerce to extend the period of liability on this basis
rather than to set a uniform cutoff is not self-evident and is, in fact, violative of the
rationale of the framers of the Uniform Commercial Code. See supra note 70.
186. 542 A.2d 421 (Md. Ct. App. 1988). In Hanscome, an interior decorator was
denied indemnity against her supplier and a manufacturer for damaged merchandise
on two grounds: (1) the three-year limitation period for a negligence action and the
four-year limitation period for a breach of warranty action had run, id. at 425, and
(2) she failed to show facts sufficient to state a cause of action for indemnification
by failing to show that either the supplier or the manufacturer were responsible for
the damage. Id. at 426-28.
187. Id at 425.
188. Id. at 426-28. The court distinguished between contract- and tort-based indemni-
ty, primarily adopting the analysis used in People's Democratic Republic of Yemen v.
Goodpasture, Inc., 782 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1986), discussed supra at notes 119-125. It
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the fact .that the Hanscome conclusion on the indemnity-U.C.C. conflict
was not dispositive, but merely allowed the court to reach the indemnity
issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court cited Hanscome's nondispositive
holding in Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Construction Co."s In Wood Riv-
er, the city paid the construction company to install a water-treatment
plant, which broke down and could not be repaired."w About five years
after delivery and initiation of operations, a period in which the system
repeatedly broke down, the construction company filed a third-party
complaint against the manufacturer of the system installed by the con-
struction company.'
The Nebraska Supreme Court, recognizing the split among jurisdictions
in allowing an action for indemnity after the running of the U.C.C. stat-
ute of limitations,"g held that the rule in Nebraska is that the "statute
of limitations for indemnity does not start to run until the indemnitee is
found liable to a third party."" Reasoning that a buyer who buys and
then resells a product is not in a position to be put on notice of a hidden
defect, the court stated that its result "does not imprudently enlarge the
statute of limitations for breach of warranty."' The court recognized,
however, that other jurisdictions have held to the contrary "to avoid the
problem of unending litigation."" Perhaps most telling, Nebraska, as a
preliminary matter, held that "[a] duty to indemnify will always arise out
of another more basic obligation whether it arises on contract or
tort.""' This separate recognition of a duty to indemnify--outside the
express language of the U.C.C.-at a minimum presaged and probably
mandated the court's holding.1 7
then assumed the "most liberal view" of contract- and tort-based indemnity to "find
appellant's case lacking." Hanscome, 542 A.2d at 427.
189. 444 N.W.2d 305 (Neb. 1989).
190. Id at 306.
191. Id. at 307.
192. Id. at 309-10. The court appears to have miscast Anixter Bros., Inc. v. Cent
Steel & Wire Co., 463 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. 1984), supra note 170, as favoring strict appli-
cation of the U.C.C. limitation.
193. Id at 311.
194. Id
195. Id. at 310 (citing PPG Indus. v. Genson, 217 S.E.2d 479 (Ga. 1975); Perry v.
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984); Farmers Nat'l Bank v.
Wickham Pipeline, 759 P.2d 71 (Idaho 1988)).
196. Id. at 309.
197. See also Walker Mfg. Co. v. Dickerson, Inc., 619 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1980). Using
North Carolina law, the court held that a roofing subcontractor could assert a claim
for indemnity against a supplier despite the running of the 2-725 limitation. Id. at
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IV. ANALYSIS: INCENTIVES AND INVECTIVE
A. Introduction
The reasoning of the cases passing on whether a cause of action for
indemnity survives the four-year statute of limitations for breach of war-
ranty claims established by the Uniform Commercial Code is diverse.
One court looks to legislative intent;" another lays the foundation of
its decision on the distinction between tort and contract actions.us One
court's concern is hidden defects;'n another's is distinguishing tort and
contractual duties."° To some extent, these considerations must be the
result of facts presented to the courts. But in a larger sense, no matter
what factors courts consider, the resolution of the issue implicates fair-
ness concerns and reflects judicial thinking about the extent of re-
sponsibility society should entrust to and place upon buyers who use
their goods in a manner that affects third parties and upon sellers who
attempt to supply goods to fulfill those buyers' needs.
The strongest rhetorical point against the U.C.C. limitation might be
made by a critical legal scholar, who could describe a result in its favor
as reinforcing the oppressive message "that inequality, powerlessness,
310. The majority contended that the "U.C.C. was not intended to shield manufactur-
ers of defective products from indemnity claims made by their purchasers more than
four years from the date of sale by the manufacturer." Id, The dissent, however,
carefully analyzed existing case law and concluded that the majority had erred by
permitting indemnity for the breach of warranty claim based on negligence precedent.
Id. at 313 (Field, J., concurring and dissenting). In essence, Justice Field argued that
"common law indemnity" must be based on the lack of fault of the party seeking
indemnity and the existence of fault of the party from whom indemnity is sought.
See id. at 311. Breach of warranty, where the issue is not what a defendant did
wrong, but whether the product it sold performed, is therefore not a proper cause of
action upon which to seek relief under indemnity.
In In re Fela Asbestos Utigation, 638 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1986), rev'd by
Wingo v. Celofex Corp., 834 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1987) on negligence-of-user grounds,
the court cited RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§ 2-314.15 at 124 (3d ed. 1983), for the proposition that indemnity and warranty ac-
tions are covered by different limitations. Fela, 638 F. Supp. at 112. However, a re-
view of Anderson clarifies the confusion on this issue. Despite its support for allow-
ing indemnity under a breach of warranty theory, the treatise also notes that the
warranty' limitation applies "regardless of the particular kind of harm sustained by the
plaintiff." ANDERSON, supra § 2-725:55 at 117.
See also Maurice T. Brunner, What Statute of Limitation Covers Action for In-
demnity?, Annotation, 57 A.LR.3D 833 (1974).
198. Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 413, 416 (S.D. 1990).
199. P.P.G. Indus. v. Genson, 217 S.E.2d 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975). See Walker, 619
F.2d at 312.
200. Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 444 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Neb. 1989).
201. Hanscome v. Perry, 542 A.2d 421, 426-28 (Md. Ct. App. 1988).
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and alienation [demonstrated through the lack of a remedy] are conse-
quences of what people have chosen through their own action."' An-
other critic might say that the limitation "endowed economically domi-
nant commercial practices with undeserved normativity."' On the oth-
er hand, allowing indemnity despite the U.C.C. limitation may be framed
more objectively as permitting "the courts [to] read the principles of tort
law... into contracts," thus giving "the parties what the parties would
have bargained for expressly if they had not relied on the courts to sup-
ply terms.""' Judges, however, are rarely so direct.'
In considering whether to allow the extra-statutory remedy of indemni-
ty after the statute has run, a further preliminary consideration should be
the general commercial posture of the defendant. In standard contract
actions involving the violation of express contractual duties of future
performance, breach is often voluntary and intentional and, for society as
a whole, efficient, because the breach permits resources devoted to the
contract to be put to more productive use elsewhere.2 Tort law, in-
cluding strict products liability and negligence actions, must be consid-
ered separately from standard contract and warranty actions because the
purpose of tort law is not to enforce contracts, but to protect users, con-
sumers, and others from conduct society views as inappropriate.2 7
202. Jay M. Feinman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 373, 374 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
203. MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOxY 211 (1992). Horwitz notes the supposed division between
the political function of legislators (who passed the U.C.C.) and the scientific function
of judges (who invented the cause of action for indemnity and who retain a great
deal of discretion in its application, even where codification has occurred). Id. at 9.
204. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 136 (1987).
205. See generally supra notes 191-201.
206. See POSNER, supra note 37, at 128-29. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Ffficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L REv.
554 (1977).
207. Justice Holmes explained the difference between philosophies of contract and
tort recoveries:
When a man commits a tort he incurs by force of the law a liability to dam-
ages, measured by certain rules. When a man makes a contract he incurs by
force of the law a liability to damages, unless a certain promised event co-
mes to pass. But unlike the case of torts, as the contract is by mutual con-
sent, the parties themselves, expressly or by implication, fix the rule by
which the damages are to be measured.
Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Ol Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903).
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Breach of warranty may be classified as a hybrid of tort and contract
law." The conduct is almost never volitional. Despite the rhetoric of
the strict products liability bar,2" product liability defendants want to
perform contracts by supplying satisfactory goods because commercial
success suffers from earning a reputation as a manufacturer of inferior
products. In reconciling standard contract, breach of warranty, and tort
recovery, it is important to remember that if one form of recovery fails,
another is often available. In the issue at hand, for example, if a breach
of warranty cause of action is barred by the limitation period, a strict
products liability action is often available, depending on the jurisdictional
requirements. Thus, it is short-sighted to view the breach of warranty
action in isolation from other methods of recovery. The breadth of prod-
ucts liability law mandates that each jurisdiction independently analyze
the prudence of allowing indemnity after the U.C.C. limitation runs.
B. Indemnity v. Consequential Damages
1. Form and Substance of Relief
The three questions raised by Yemen v. Good Pasture, Inc.21 yield
the most direct .approach of analyzing the issue at hand. The first ques-
tion is why should a court distinguish payments made to third parties in
the form of indemnity from payments made for other costs imposed on
defendants by the consequences of a breach of warranty? These other
costs are what Yemen and the U.C.C. call consequential damages."' If
indemnity recovery is distinguishable from consequential damage, per-
haps it should survive as a separate cause of action. If it is not, it bol-
sters the argument of those jurisdictions that disallow indemnity as con-
sequential damage barred by the U.C.C. limitation.
The rationale for permitting indemnity recovery, but not consequential
damage recovery, is not squarely addressed in the cases. Morris finds a
partial answer "in principles of equity"212 and in preventing "unjust en-
richment."21 However, the gravamen of unjust enrichment in a sale of
goods context is elusive. That it is unjust for a seller to retain the consid-
eration paid for a chattel when that chattel has apparently functioned
208. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 18, § 92 at 655 (discussing theIncreasing difficul-
ty of distinguishing between tort and contract actions).
209. See Kenneth Jost, Tampering with Evidence: The Liability and Competitive-
ness Myth, 78 A.B.A. J. 44 (April 1992).
210. 782 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1986). See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
211. For extensive analysis of consequential damages, which is well beyond the
scope of this Comment, see WHrrE, supra note 85, at §§ 6-5 & 10-4.
212. Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 413, 417 (S.D. 1990) (citing RE-
STATEMENT OF RE'rrruMoN § 76).
213. Id.
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well enough during a four-year period to prevent the buyer from filing
suit is not self-evident. It may be equally unjust to unsettle an old
transaction. 14 Moreover, indemnity recovery, if awarded, may have no
relation to price. If such damage recovery exceeds the consideration
paid, an unjust enrichment theory applied here must assume as its under-
lying premise that the seller obtained enrichment from the sale of goods
beyond the consideration paid. While it is possible to argue that the sell-
er may have benefited from sales of unwarrantable goods to other buy-
ers, and that it is therefore unjust for the seller to retain that enrichment,
such a question is outside the action on the contract associated with the
U.C.C.215 The Code allows recovery for "injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty. "218 However, trans-
ferring the rationale of this section to support an indemnity award is un-
justified because the statute of limitations clearly applies with respect to
recovery under this provision."'
A specific, fact-sensitive answer to the first question about distinguish-
ing consequential damages from indemnity is suggested by Carrier,"'
although the court did not consider such an answer. As a defendant in
214. See Simon Rottenberg, Mistaken Judicial Activism: Proposed Constraints on
Creditor Remedies, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 335 (James A. Dorn &
Henry G. Manne, eds. 1987). "In a system of liberty, the smallest possible number of
constraints is put on the rights of individuals to ... define the terms on which ex-
change is consummated." Id. In jurisdictions where indemnity is a way around § 2-
725, it has become a bargained-for term, at least insofar as it is tenable to ignore the
illusionary concept that players in the commercial sector are aware of potential reme-
dies; so, of course, is the repose of such claims a bargained-for term, where it is ap-
plicable and where knowledge is assumed. Thus, liberty is only served where courts
allow parties to contracts to bargain away such terms.
215. Unust enrichment is better limited to situations in which one party confers a
benefit on another for which it is generally proper for the benefiting party to pay.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 37, § 4.13 at 133-34. With respect to post-transaction
recovery for failure to confer the expected benefit, the relatively simple contract
analysis of unjust enrichment is insufficient, and the tort analysis discussed infra
notes 248-260 and accompanying text is more appropriate.
216. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1992). The official comment notes that "'proximate' cause
turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such in-
spection as would have revealed the defect." Id. at 5. This comment is particularly
applicable in cases such as Carrier Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565 (Ct.
App. 1992), in which a user of hazardous chemicals might be held to have a reason-
able duty to inspect its processing system to ensure that it is not leaking.
217. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1992). See supra note 216 for the rationale of the proximate
cause requirement.
218. See text accompanying notes 145-154.
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an environmental case, Carrier may arguably be held to a higher standard
because of the existence of statutes imposing liability for environmental-
ly dangerous activity.21 The court did not address such claims, but in-
stead permitted plaintiffs to recover for essentially economic harm in a
case that might be better characterized as a products liability or negli-
gence action, or better yet, as environmental litigation.
Moreover, allowing indemnity in a Carrier-style situation results in
arguably reduced incentives for the owners and operators of industrial
equipment to diligently monitor and maintain the equipment. Under the
Morris test suggested by South Dakota, Carrier would arguably fail for
being unable to show it was "free of wrongdoing"' because it polluted
the environment." While Carrier could argue that such a consequence
was partly the result of the system installed by Detrex, the fact remains
that Carrier possessed and controlled the malfunctioning system for
more than four years before discovering that it was contaminating the
ground.222 It is untenable to argue that no fault was attributable to Car-
rier, particularly in light of the government's finding that Carrier was re-
sponsible for clean-up.' 2 Carrier is clearly outside the scope of tradi-
tional indenmity, which requires the absence of any fault by the indem-
nitee if indemnity is to be recovered.'
219. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1983). "[A]ny person who by contract...
arranged for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances .. .shall be liable
for ... necessary costs of response . . . ." Id.
220. Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 413, 417 (S.D. 1990).
221. Carrier estimated that it incurred $10,000,000 in clean-up costs. Carrier Corp. v.
Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1992).
222. It is ironic that the U.C.C. is now beginning to garner criticism as lacking in
consumer protection. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELMINARY REPORT 17-20 (1990). The code's four-year limi-
tation presents the more socially-enlightened position by increasing incentives to the
party in the best position to prevent environmental harm to monitor the performance
of its equipment, to maintain environmental controls, and to make more timely detec-
tion of environmental damage.
In the contract setting of Carrier, the common law policy behind barring indem-
nity among joint tortfeasors shows through: the burden to prevent the harm should
be placed on the party in the best position to avoid it. See POSNER, supra note 37
§ 6.8 at 189. Posner notes that indemnity fulfills the goal of "shift[ing] the ultimate
liability to the most efficient accident avoider." Id, However, his praise for indemnity
relates to its use in tort rather than contract, where the parties have an opportunity
to bargain for risk and therefore achieve a much more efficient result than any court
can hope to impose. See id.
223. Id. The clean-up order, authorized by CAL WATER CODE § 13304 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1993), was issued to Carrier, not Detrex. Carrier, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567.
224. However, in California, and in many other jurisdictions, the traditional rule re-
quiring complete absence of fault by the party seeking indemnity was abrogated.
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 907 (Cal. 1978) (en
banc). The potential effect of comparative fault statutes remains interesting. See Miller
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To return, then, to the first question raised by Yemen, regarding the
rationale for distinguishing consequential from indemnity damages, a fi-
nal potential distinction is the holding of some courts that to establish in-
demnity, there must be a legal duty in the indemnitee to make pay-
ment.' However, this requirement of a legal duty is neither universal
nor necessarily correct.' In Carrier, the court conceded that allowing
indemnity was outside the "traditional setting" for such relief because
there was no legal duty per se, but found that "the potential to merit in-
demnification" was sufficient to permit it.' In Anixter, the court found
a legal duty equivalent to that in a products liability action, despite the
fact that the only harm to the indemnitee was the damage claim against
it.' If Illinois in fact requires a legal duty upon which to base an in-
demnity claim, the duty imposed by an "implied contract of indemnity" is
apparently sufficient.' In Cyr, a personal injury action, either the duty
of due care or a strict products liability theory could be used to establish
the indenudtor's legal duty to the indemnitee.' In Wood River, the
court held that a "duty to indemnify will always arise out of another
more basic obligation whether it arises on contract or tort."23' In the
end, such broad language leads to the danger of completely eviscerating
the U.C.C., which limits consequential damages to those that are foresee-
able and proximately caused by the breach of warranty unless they cause
injury to person or property.'S Nevertheless, courts do at least implied-
v. Stouffer, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding respondeat superior survives
comparative fault statute). See generally 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 38, at 131 (1991).
225. See Fulton Ins. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 493 P.2d 138, 141 (Or. 1972).
226. In Fulton, the court cited the REsTATEMENT OF RESTUTION, § 76 (1937), for
the requirement that the indemnitee discharge a "legal" obligation of the indemnitor.
Id. at 140-41. But see 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 32, at 122 (1991). "The right to such
indemnity exists independently of statute." Id. (citing Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan
Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 479 N.E.2d 1386 (Mass. 1985)). Contractual relations are imma-
terial to indemnity. Id. (citing Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Priewe, 348 N.W.2d 585
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984)). See also Anixter Bros., Inc. v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 463
N.E.2d 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). The Anixter court awarded indemnity in a contractual
setting by finding a legal obligation in the form of an "implied contract of indemnity."
Id. at 917.
227. Carrier, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 569.
228. 463 N.E.2d at 915, 917.
229. See id. at 917.
230. Cyr v. Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376, 1385 (Me. 1983). See supra notes 177-79.
231. Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 444 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Neb. 1989).
232. Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and
ly distinguish consequential damages from indemnity, and therefore the
second question raised by Yemen must be addressed.
2. Statutes of Limitation
The second challenge raised by Yemen for those courts and attorneys
hoping to escape the U.C.C. limitation is to find a difference between
consequential damages and indemnity that justifies banning consequential
damages after four years, but permits indemnity after four years. Of
courts opining on the statute of limitation conflict, again, the only one to
address this issue directly was Yemen, which summarily concluded that
there was no difference between consequential damages and a claim for
indemnity for a shipping charge, and thus indemnity was barred as being
more properly a claim for consequential damages.' One court, perhaps
understating the problem, noted that "indemnity is sometimes confused
with other legal concepts such as suretyship, consequential damages,
assignment, or third party beneficiary rights."' The Yemen court, how-
ever, suffered no such confusion, holding that "[i]f an implied contract
for indemnification were to be found here, one would have to be found
in nearly every commodities sale contract that lacked a clause excluding
it, a result that would reverse all standard contract and indemnity
law." . Carrier, again, provides a contrast to Yemen. In Carrier, the
legal indemnity sought was for clean-up and abatement costs for ground-
water contamination.' Normally, such costs would be consequential
damages because a firm selling and installing equipment to dispose of
hazardous chemicals would presumably have "reason to know" that
equipment failure would result in clean-up costs.2 ' There would also be
injury to property, if not person.' The court, however, held that con-
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty.
U.C.C. 2-715 (1992).
233. People's Democratic Republic of Yemen v. Goodpasture, Inc., 782 F.2d 346, 350
(2d Cir. 1986). See supra notes 119-125. The court in Carrier noted that summary
judgment was precluded because the original proposal accepted by Carrier exempted
Detrex from consequential damages while the last contractual documents accepted by
Detrex warranted indemnity. Carrier Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 569
(1992).
234. Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 500, 502 (S.C. Ct. App.
1990).
235. Yemen, 782 F.2d at 351.
236. Carrier, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567.
237. U.C.C. § 2-715(a)(2) (1992).
238. U.C.C. § 2-715(b)(2) (1992). The plaintiff in Carrier conceded it was not seek-
ing relief for injury to real property, although the court failed to explain why. One
reason for its position could be evidentiary problems, because it is possible to clean
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flicting warranty provisions that Detrex wrote to limit its liability and
Carrier wrote to impose liability on Detrex presented an issue of fact for
trial.' Thus, Carrier is at least distinguishable from Yemen on this
point.
Section 2-715 of the Code yields a clear, if flexible, definition of conse-
quential damages.' While it omits "economic harm" in clause (b), a
form of indemnity relief is available under clause (a), although it is
slightly limited by the "reason to know" requirement./" Compared with
consequential damages, indemnity law is less clearly and more diversely
defined. Those definitions range from discharge of a legal obligation, ac-
companied by a duty from indemnitor to both indemnitee and a third
party,' to a right that "will always arise out of another more basic ob-
ligation whether it arises on contract or tort."' As a rationale for the
latter, broader description, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that
resellers are not in a position to discover any breach of warranty in the
form of a latent defect during the running of the U.C.C. statute if the
good is in the dominion and control of the buyer.'
One question lacking a definitive answer is the effect of a statute of
limitation on the decision of potential litigants to litigate. On one hand, it
is tenable that a limitation encourages parties to commence litigation to
avoid a time bar. On the other hand, one might believe that people do
not pay much attention to limitations until the situation becomes so des-
perate as to require judicial intervention. Both perceptions are no doubt
at least occasionally correct. While the framers of U.C.C. Article 2 at
least implicitly saw the purpose of the limitation as reducing litigation by
up property after a spill; another could be that the California limitation for injury to
real property had run, perhaps blocking recovery under CAL Civ. PO. CODE § 338
(West 1992). See Carrier, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570; see also supra note 154.
239. d. at 569.
240. See supra note 232.
241. This provision liberally codified the classic rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
242. One court requires that-
(1) the payor (prospective indenmitee) must discharge a legal obligation the
payor owes to a third person; (2) the prospective indemnitor must also be
liable to the third person; and (3) as between the claimant payor and the
prospective indemnitor, the obligation ought to be discharged by the indemni-.
tor.
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984).
243. Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 444 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Neb. 1989).
244. Id. at 311.
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cutting off old claims," the drafters of Article 2A, the U.C.C. lease sec-
tion, appear to believe that the former is the primary effect. Their com-
ment to the statute of limitations in lease cases justifies accrual of a
cause of action for default under a lease contract at the time of discov-
ery, rather than at the time of tender, on grounds that encouraging par-
ties in a lease relationship to undertake litigation "makes little sense"
when the mere passage of time can often alleviate disputes.' One
might argue, however, that allowing causes of action to survive until a
later date poisons the lessor-lessee relationship."47
C. Duty Questions
The third question raised by Yemen is why the court requires the find-
ing of a duty running from a potential third-party indemnitor to the party
to whom the indemnitee made (or will have to make) payment to allow
indemnity.' In this regard, the indemnity problem is analogous to the
perennial duty question in tort law.'1 Few of the courts addressing the
indemnity question in the Article 2 breach of warranty situation have
examined the duty issue.' Commentators, however, have frequently
addressed the underlying issue it raises, the use of tort theory in contract
law." When it comes to personal injury actions, having three different
245. See supra note 70.
246. See U.C.C. § 2A-506.
247. Compare § 2-725 with § 2A-506(2):
A cause of action for default accrues when the act or omission on which the
default or breach of warranty is based is or should have been discovered by
the aggrieved party, or when the default occurs, whichever is later. A cause
of action for indemnity accrues when the act or omission on which the claim
for indemnity is based is or should have, been discovered by the indemnified
party, whichever is later.
U.C.C. § 2A-506(2) (1992). If a legislature had drafted and passed both § 2-725 and
§ 2A-506, one could argue that the more specific language in § 2A-506 with respect to
leasing indicated that the legislature did not intend for courts to expand the meaning
of the plain language of § 2-725 to permit the actions specifically allowed by § 2A-506.
Since these are uniform laws, however, such an analysis becomes problematic because
such intent cannot be assumed in good faith.
248. Cf. Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 413, 418 (S.D. 1990) (J. Sa-
bers, dissenting) ("[Ain indemnity claim is a separate cause of action, independent of
the underlying liability.").
249. See KEETON, supra note 18 § 53 at 356-59. While Prosser and Keeton generally
give the duty question short shrift, noting that "courts will find a duty where, in
general, reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists," id. at 359,
other commentators-and the California courts-have adopted a more intellectually
challenging approach to the issue. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negli-
gence Cases, 28 CoLuM. L Rsv. 1014 (1929).
250. While several courts note that indemnity requires the discovery of a legal duty,
only Yemen among those surveyed made significant use of the issue.
251. See, e.g., David Frisch et al., Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Gen-
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theories-breach of warranty, negligence, and strict products liabili-
ty-upon which to base a claim is cumbersome and has resulted in a
system of ill-uniformity. The issue, in its clearest form, is simply whether
defendant has a violated a duty to plaintiff for which a court will recog-
nize a remedy. Such a duty may be based on either economic or moral
concerns. Presumably, economic duties will more often be based in con-
tract law while moral duties will find their rationale in tort law. Profes-
sor Dobbs compared the choice between tort and contract actions to the
historical pleading device of waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit,'
the plea developed by common law judges to allow recovery for
breaches of promises formerly heard only by equity courts. He explained
that
[w]hen the assumpsit theory has been pursued in tort cases, the purpose has usu-
ally been to get the advantage of some procedural incident attached to contract
claims, such as the contract statute of limitations. Whatever sense this may have
made before the forms of action were abolished, it does not seem to make much
sense today to permit a plaintiff to call his case tort or contract to manipulate the
statute of limitationsY2
The distinction made by Professor Dobbs between tort and contract
actions presents one way of thinking about whether to apply the U.C.C.
or indemnity limitation: Decide first whether the action sounds in tort or
contract and then apply the indemnity limitation to tort and the U.C.C.
limitation to contract. In other words, the issue becomes whether certain
facts create a duty that the law will recognize, either through the words
of a contract or a duty of reasonable care.'
Representative thinking among the defense bar is similar to the analy-
sis of Professor Dobbs. The American Bar Association Business Law
Section's publication2  criticized Maxfield v. Simmons' as "poorly
reasoned," because although the court "correctly recognized that U.C.C.
section 2-725 'controls in causes of action based on contract principles
but not in those causes of action based on tort principles,'" it also held
eral Prmvions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 42 Bus. LAW. 1213,
1256 (1987) (criticizing Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986) as
"fosterling] the often artificial distinction between tort and contract").
252. DAN B. DOBBS, Rmwm § 4.2, at 238 (1973).
253. Id. at 239.
254. See inra, notes 286-295, proposing the application of a duty analysis to set
rules to determine whether to allow the indemnity or U.C.C. limitation to control.
255. Fairffx Leary, Jr. & David Frisch, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers,
and Documents of Title, 39 BUS. LAW. 1851 (1984).
256. 449 N.E.2d 110 (IlL. 1983); see supra notes 163, 164 and accompanying text.
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that "the contract statute has no application to the indemnity cause of
action."' 1 The survey interpreted Maxfield as holding that while the
duty to indemnify arose from contract, indemnity itself is grounded in
tort and therefore the contract limitation should not apply.'
In Ross v. Stanley,' the Fifth Circuit decided that even a fiduciary
relationship between a shareholder and a utility company was an insuffi-
ciently powerful duty to justify tolling the statute of limitations on a
cause of action for restitution. The statute ran from the time the utility
allegedly made improper contracts that were the subject of the litigation
- not from when the profits on those contracts were realized." The
bottom line is that even where duty is powerful, statutes of limitation
may operate to destroy any remedy otherwise based on such a duty. A
court so disposed could thus dispose of the issue at hand with a simple
syllogism: Statutes of limitation destroy duties. The limitation has run.
Therefore, the duty to indemnify is dead.
D. Miscellaneous Concerns
A wide variety of rationale outside the questions raised by Yemen may
be asserted for and against allowing indemnity to transcend the U.C.C.
The arguments may be divided into two categories concerned with two
discrete issues: efficiency and fairness, or as they are characterized in
the title of this section, incentives and invective. Foremost among effi-
ciency concerns, at least in the view of the framers of the code, is the re-
cord retention problem."6 Whether this remains a problem is doubtful.
With other causes of action involving the sale of goods, such as negli-
gence and strict products liability, surviving well into the future, it is a
foolish manufacturer who takes comfort from the possible repose of the
breach or warranty action after four years. Moreover, technology devel-
oped since the writing of the code that permits the contents of hundreds
of file cabinets to be reduced onto a single hard disk drive on a single
desktop also weakens the record-storage rationale.' Secondarily, a ju-
risdictional division with respect to allowing a cause of action for breach
of warranty to survive indefinitely by renaming it indemnity presumably
has some marginal economic effect on interstate commerce as a non-tar-
iff trade barrier, although the significance of such a holding, given the
257. Id. at 1897.
258. Id.
259. 346 F.2d 645 (5t Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
260. Id.
261. This is the only purely economic rationale noted in the Official Comment to
§ 2-725.
262. See generally Leslie M. Bock, Sales in the Iformation Age: Reconsidering the
Scope of Article 2, 27 IDAHo L. REV. 463 (1990-91).
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fact that the split is only now emerging, is difficult to evaluate.' The
heart of the economic concern is to be found elsewhere.
One of the more compelling approaches to analyzing the efficiency of
indemnity was explained by the Wyoming Supreme Court.' The court,
citing Judge Posner extensively, noted that in situations in which it is
more efficient for one party than the other to take measures to avoid
loss, indemnity should be awarded because doing so discourages redun-
dant accident avoidance expenditures.' On the other hand, where effi-
ciency concerns mandate that both parties take precautions to avoid
accidents, classic indemnity, which shifts the entire burden onto the
party adjudged more culpable, is inefficient because it allows the party
less culpable to take no precautions." The efficiency of banning a
cause of action for indemnity four years after tender of delivery is less
clear. However, it seems safe to assume that in most cases, four years
after possession of a good is taken, the burden of taking precautions
should shift to the party in possession.'
The economic effects of enforcing a statute of limitations were implic-
itly explored by R.H. Coase in his seminal work on the Problem of Social
Cost,' in which he examined the utility of pricing systems withas
and without' liability for damages. Under the U.C.C., there is potential
liability if an action is filed within four years of tender, there is no lia-
bility if it is not filed within the period. Coase was concerned with nui-
sance. However, the harmful effects of unindemnified loss and litigation
are just as real as nuisance effects. Thus, Coase's statement of the prob-
lem and his prescription are on point: "The cost of exercising a right...
is always the loss which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the
263. See generaUy Barry A. Sanders, Non-Tarf Trade Barriers, DEVELOPING AN
ExPORT TRADE BusiNEss, 458 PgAC. L INs. 113 (1988) for a discussion of trade barri-
ers with respect to international law.
264. Schneider Nat'1, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992).
265. Id at 572 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.8 (3d ed.
1986); WMAM AL LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OR TORT
LAW 191 (1987)). The court noted that Judge Posner's analysis "is precise and persua-
sive." Schneider, 843 P.2d at 572 n.10.
266. Id. at 572.
267. This seems especially clear in cases like Carrier, in which it is necessary to
impose incentives on users of products to maintain their equipment to prevent envi-
ronmental damage.
268. 3 J.L & ECON. 1 (1960).
269. Id at 2.
270. Id. at 6.
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exercise of that ight .... In devising and choosing between social ar-
rangements we should have regard for the total effect."27" ' In an ideal
world, the running of the statute would be set at the point in time at
which the cost to society of litigation exceeded the benefit to society of
equitably attributing liability. Whether four years is an accurate estimate
is a proper subject for empirical research.
Allowing recovery for breach of contract may be based either on pro-
tecting the expectations of plaintiffs or on imposing incentives on defen-
dants not to breach. 72 While not looking at the economic effect of the
statute of limitations per se, one scholar analyzed the U.C.C.'s reasonable
time provisions and concluded that a court strictly construing the U.C.C.
reached the most efficient result." One would suspect that a similar
conclusion would be reached through a similar analysis of the Code's
limitation period.
However, one argument for increasing the limitations period by allow-
ing the statute to run from the date of indemnity rather than the date of
delivery is that the longer period increases the incentive on manufactur-
ers to take greater care in the design and manufacturing process. 4
Whether this is actually the case, however, is debatable. While manufac-
turers-and their insurers-undoubtedly consider the risk of litigation
during the design and manufacturing process, there is no evidence that
less sophisticated manufacturers consider it in such detail so as to weigh
statute of limitations concerns. Thus, it is possible that the behavior of
many manufacturers will be unaffected by the limitation rule adopt-
ed.'
If this is the case, and therefore the increased level of litigation permit-
ted by extending the statute of limitations fails to reduce economic and
physical injury, then the statute of limitations merely reduces the cost of
litigation by reducing its volume. This would presumably free up resourc-
271. Id. at 44.
272. John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Continct Damages, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
277, 278 (1972).
273. George Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 IAv. L REV. 960,
985 (1978).
274. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford & Robert F. Stone, Liability, Innovation, and
Safety in the Chemical Industry, in T1E LABHITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABIr
LAW ON SAMFY & INNOVATION 394 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, eds., 1991).
The author discusses the imposition of liability generally, but one can argue that
extending the period of liability would have the same general effect.
275. For nationwide sellers, it is unrealistic to expect that they might consider the
various limitations rules in each state; in this sense, a uniform limitation rule would
certainly contribute to efficiency by lowering the cost to manufacturers of making
such calculations.
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es of manufacturers for other purposes, such as safety improvements.276
If, on the other hand, an extended statute of limitations is effective in
creating incentives that modify manufacturer behavior, one such incen-
tive would presumably be to build more durable products. The efficiency
of such an incentive is not transparent. Economists would argue that
durability questions are better left to bargaining between buyers and
sellers, at least in commercial settings where the parties have access to
information about the costs and necessities for building a certain degree
of durability into a product.'
From the perspective of the defendant who may be asked to indemnify
a buyer for the malfunctioning of a good, the "fairest" way to attribute
cost would seem to be to set a strict cut-off date. But from the perspec-
tive of plaintiffs who may not have discovered any injury until after the
running of the statute, the fairest solution is a discovery rule.' Fair-
ness, however, is being better served in word than by law. For example,
in Carrier, California left merchants unprotected by repose. However,
California does cut off liability for actions against lawyers2" and doc-
tors.' Why shouldn't merchants get the same protection, if not the
same short time period?"
Fairness may be served by the limitation if courts exclude stale evi-
dence and the opportunity for error so invited.2' It may also be served
by whatever amorphous feeling of justice is experienced by citizens see-
ing alleged breachers held accountable for their wrongdoing. On the
other hand, such utility must be balanced against the equally amorphous
utility of those engaged in commerce who benefit from whatever certain-
ty a limitation for a warranty cause of action might yield. The utility
experienced by either side in the context of warranty is limited, however,
by the fact that a cause of action for products liability survives, whatever
the limitation for breach of warranty. After finding that the rule of strict
construction of the U.C.C. limitation enjoyed a "slight majority" over the
276. See generally HUJBER, supra note 17.
277. See inft text accompanying note 295.
278. See generally Stephen V.' O'Neal, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations:
California's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CAL L REv. 106 (1980) (ad-
vocating that courts unilaterally adopt, without legislative action, a policy that the
statute for all causes of action commences on the date of discovery of the injury).
279. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1982).
280. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982).
281. See O'Neal, supra note 278 at 122.
282. See supra note 76.
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rule allowing indemnity, one commentator suggested that the former was
the better rule "because the rule on accrual in Article 2 apparently was
intended to create a highly predictable cut-off rule" in comparison to the
2-607 notice rule, which merely uses a "reasonable time" standard.'s
Finally, while the effect of denying indemnity on the basis of the
U.C.C. limitation may at times seem unfair to plaintiffs, if there is legisla-
tive intent that such claims be barred, courts must arguably comply.'
In examining the fairness of allowing an indemnity action to survive, it is
helpful to distinguish between express and implied indemnity. The provi-
sion in 2-725(2) allowing parties to explicitly extend a warranty of future
performance presumably also allows an explicit indemnity agreement
that lasts more than four years, notwithstanding 2-725(1)'s ban on ex-
tending the statute of limitations.'8 This provision for extension by
agreement in the U.C.C. evinces an intent to permit parties to freely bar-
gain about liability rather than have it imposed by a court.
V. PROPOSAL
It is well-settled that the manufacturer of a defectively dangerous prod-
uct should be held liable for physical Wiury caused by that product to an
individual.' In the realm of economic and property losses, however,
the law is murkier. The old common law rule requiring privity of contract
was simple, but unfair to innocent users harmed, either physically or
283. John C. Reitz, Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims
Rule in UC.C., § 2-607(3)(a), 73 CORNELL L REv. 534, 571 n.111 (1988) (Reitz cites
Maxfield v. Simmons, 449 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. 1983), as holding that 2-725 bars indemnity,
although an Illinois court of appeals interpreted the case differently. See Anixter
Bros., Inc. v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 463 N.E.2d 913 (11. App. 1984).
284. Courts could arguably ignore legislative intent on the grounds that such stat-
utes violate the "open courts" amendments in some state constitutions. See, e.g.,
Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 413, 419 (S.D. 1990) (Sabers, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that South Dakota's constitution should be so construed). However,
applying such amendments to causes of action that did not exist at the time of ratifi-
cation is troublesome, to say the least. See, e.g., S.D. CoNST. art. VI, § 20 (adopted
1889); THfOPHiLus PARsoNs, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs 613 (9th ed. 1904). "If there be
no express warranty, the common law, in general, implies none. Its rule is, unques-
tionably, both in England and in this country, caveat emptor." Id. See also Persichini
v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987) (preservation of U.C.C. is rational
basis making 2-725 constitutional under state and federal constitutions); Mayo v.
Rouselle Corp., 375 So. 2d 449 (Ala. 1979) (statute running from date of sale rather
than date of injury was consistent with the Alabama Constitution).
285. See generally Howard Foss, Interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code: Meth-
odologies Use, Misused and Unused, 20 GOLDEN GATE U.L REv. 29 (1990).
286. Such liability, as long as it is not so harsh as to cut off incentives to build
products at all, encourages manufacturers to build safer products and insures users
against harm. But see KEgrON, -supra note 18, § 75 at 53438 (emphasizing insurance
aspects over incentives).
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economically, by defective products.2 The limits of liability continue to
test courts and thus the judiciary faces an ongoing challenge to set the
right rule. Conflict among states under the Uniform Commercial Code
betrays a reluctance among those courts to look at policy issues thor-
oughly enough to establish a genuine consensus. With a handful of ex-
ceptions, courts are likely to either block indemnity with a few words
about legislative intent or to extend it by citing equitable concerns. While
the former is probably the better result, the fact that courts cite the
framers of the code instead of actual state legislators indicates that true
legislative intent is not what is being examined. The lack of such evi-
dence leaves the door open for a more thoughtful analysis of the issue,
which itself could start a trend toward uniformity in this most disuniform
area.
An alternative way to frame the issue is in two parts: (1) is there a
duty, contractual or otherwise, and (2) should the running of the U.C.C.
statute of limitations extinguish that non-contractual duty? If one as-
sumes that the contract gave rise to the duty, the U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions would presumably operate to extinguish the duty. If the duty arose
outside the contract, however, the cases analyzed indicate that opinion is
divided about whether it should be extinguished by operation of the
U.C.C. statute of limitations.
Despite its contractual origins,' whether to allow indemnity is ana-
lyzed more properly under tort law than contract law.' The reason is
simple: Imposing a duty to indemnify in cases such as those presented
goes outside the contract, notwithstanding any legal fiction that courts
are merely enforcing "implied" contracts. To call indemnity a contractual
action forces consideration of it under contractual rules, something too
many courts have been reluctant to do. Before allowing such extra-con-
tractual recovery, courts ought to openly examine the policy consider-
ations involved. A good starting place is a California Supreme Court case,
which set out a list of policy factors courts should consider when decid-
ing whether to extend liability to a defendant in a case sounding in both
287. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). -Many courts
seem more willing to allow recovery to a non-privity plaintiff when they characterize
his cause of action as one in tort than when they characterize it as one in warran-
ty." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMtERCIAL CODE 457 (3d ed. 1988).
288. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
tort and contract.' In that case, Biakanja v. Irving, the court consid-
ered whether to transcend the traditional rule that limited recovery for
economic harm to parties in privity of contract. 9 Here, the issue is
analogous because the passage of time, rather than privity, limits the
parties' recovery and liability.' The longer the time between the inci-
dent giving rise to the cause of action and the cause of action itself, the
higher the error cost to society.' The higher the error cost, the more
the expected benefit of a longer limitation period must be discounted.
The factors to be explored are (1) the extent to which the transaction
was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty of injury, (4) the closeness of con-
nection between the defendant's conduct and injury, (5) moral blame,
and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.' In looking at these fac-
tors, a strong argument can be made that liability for breach of warranty
in the form of indemnity should not extend beyond the limitation period.
No doubt contracts are intended to affect both parties, but to the extent
that indemnity arises more than four years after the contract was exe-
cuted, the intent to affect a remote party is weak at best. Moreover, the
foreseeability of harm to a plaintiff has declined considerably after four
years. Injury must be uncertain in cases violating the U.C.C. limitation;
otherwise a reasonable plaintiff would discontinue using the good. Cer-
tainty of injury applies more to factors that vary from case to case, but
again, after four years, certainty is anything but established. Moral blame
cannot very easily be established in a voluntary transaction without some
evidence of misrepresentation, in which case the action would be for
fraud and the plaintiff would not be deprived of a remedy. Finally, im-
posing indemnity liability does little to affect the possibility of future
harm. Longer exposure to liability could create an incentive to make
290. See Biakarja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
291. Id at 19. The court allowed recovery for negligent drafting of a will despite
the absence of privity between the notary who drafted a will, thus practicing law
without a license, and the beneficiary. Id.
292. "In essence there is ... often a temptation to translate a moral imperative
into a legal norm, without fully addressing the question of whether the magnitude of
the moral concern is large enough to warrant invoking the coercive power of the
state." Richard A. Epstein, 7M Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Cm. L REv.
1175, 1177 (1986). In other words, the question is whether the incremental increase
in fairness from extending the statute of limitations is of sufficient benefit to society
to justify the increased cost of litigation. Epstein also points out that the error rate
must be factored Into the equation. Id. at 1183. Any societal benefit from increasing
the limitations period must be discounted by the percentage of time the court gets
the judgment wrong.
293. See POSNER, supra note 37 at 587 (discussing efficiency and the use of "stale"
evidence).
294. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
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products more durable, but in competitive markets, such incentives
would likely be offset by more powerful market forces.'
It is important to note that plaintiffs victimized by damages caused by
defective products are not necessarily cut off from relief if the breach of
warranty limitation period has run, even if that limitation is held to bar
indemnity actions. First, courts may find that the contract that is the
basis of the claim is not subject to the U.C.C. limitation because it is one
for services rather than goods.2 ' Second, tort theories survive; in addi-
tion to strict products liability, plaintiffs may be able to plead negligence
and fraudulent concealment of the condition of the product. In an era
when courts are struggling about whether to include lost profits as con-
sequential damages,' it makes little sense to extend potential liability
even further by including anything any plaintiff may label as indemnity.
The most important point in this analysis is that rather than use the
duty factors on a case-by-case basis, they should be used to establish a
general rule. Where tort is not pleaded-except to the extent that indem-
nity is considered a tort action-there is no room for wide, case-by-case
discretion, which would destroy not only any uniformity with respect to
the section 2-725 limitation, but open other provisions of the code to
unintended flexibility as well. For the reasons stated above, the general
rule should be that Uniform Commercial Code section 2-725 operates to
cut off all actions for breach of warranty after four years. Logic requires
that claims of indemnity be included in those breach of warranty actions
because such claims are always, at best, equivalent to consequential
damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Within the statute of limitations, indemnity for purely economic harm
under breach of warranty theory is recoverable under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's consequential damages provisions. There is nothing uni-
form, however, about how different jurisdictions treat such liability after
the expiration of the limitation. The use of indemnity to breach the limi-
tation is better characterized as a punitive measure smuggled into con-
295. See supra note 274.
296. See 13ARKMY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES
§ 11.01 at S11-3 (Supp. 1989).
297. See Georgia Ports Auth. v. Servac Int'l, 415 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(adopting position that lost profits are recoverable "in appropriate cases") (citing
WHrrE, sulma note 85, § 21-3 at 142-43 (3d ed. 1988)).
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tract law than as a deterrent to contract breaking. The great tradition of
rejecting punitive measures in contract actions is therefore threatened by
the recent flurry of cases permitting an end run around the U.C.C.
If breach of warranty can be based on indemnity, with the cause of
action accruing at the time of discovery, or, still later, at the time of
payment to a third party, merchants remain subject to liability ad infini-
tum. At some point, the law must recognize bargained-for risk. Safety
concerns can be adequately protected through standard tort law. There is
no need for indemnity innovation. Possessors of goods ought to have in-
centives to use their goods safely. Indemnity removes such incentives.
Unless legislators change the words of U.C.C. section 2-725, the words
should be given their plain meaning and be allowed to cut off an "action
for breach of any contract for sale " ' commenced more than four
years after the breach.
PAUL J. WILKINSON
298. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1992) (emphasis added).
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